Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief
In this paper I aim to establish that our belief in free will is epistemically innocent. Many contemporary accounts that deal with the potential “illusion” of freedom seek to describe the pragmatic benefits of belief in free will, such as how it facilitates or grounds our notions of moral responsibi...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
2023-01-01
|
| Series: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/440532 |
| _version_ | 1797206413559201792 |
|---|---|
| author | Fabio Tollon |
| author_facet | Fabio Tollon |
| author_sort | Fabio Tollon |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper I aim to establish that our belief in free will is epistemically innocent. Many contemporary accounts that deal with the potential “illusion” of freedom seek to describe the pragmatic benefits of belief in free will, such as how it facilitates or grounds our notions of moral responsibility or basic desert. While these proposals have their place (and use), I will not explicitly engage with them. I aim to establish that our false belief in free will is an epistemically innocent belief. I will endeavour to show that if we carefully consider the circumstances in which particular beliefs (such as our belief in free will) are adopted, we can come to better appreciate not just their psychological but also their epistemic benefits. The implications, therefore, for future investigations into the philosophy of free will are that we should consider whether we have been too narrow in our pragmatic defences of free will, and that we should also be sensitive to epistemic considerations. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-24T09:06:37Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-d26b5e2814b14769b51fbeaa5d128dd6 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1845-8475 1849-0514 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-24T09:06:37Z |
| publishDate | 2023-01-01 |
| publisher | University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| record_format | Article |
| series | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj.art-d26b5e2814b14769b51fbeaa5d128dd62024-04-15T18:44:17ZengUniversity of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social SciencesEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy1845-84751849-05142023-01-01192A21510.31820/ejap.19.2.2Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False BeliefFabio Tollon0Bielefeld University, Stellenbosch University, Centre for Artificial Intelligence Research (CAIR), Pretoria, South AfricaIn this paper I aim to establish that our belief in free will is epistemically innocent. Many contemporary accounts that deal with the potential “illusion” of freedom seek to describe the pragmatic benefits of belief in free will, such as how it facilitates or grounds our notions of moral responsibility or basic desert. While these proposals have their place (and use), I will not explicitly engage with them. I aim to establish that our false belief in free will is an epistemically innocent belief. I will endeavour to show that if we carefully consider the circumstances in which particular beliefs (such as our belief in free will) are adopted, we can come to better appreciate not just their psychological but also their epistemic benefits. The implications, therefore, for future investigations into the philosophy of free will are that we should consider whether we have been too narrow in our pragmatic defences of free will, and that we should also be sensitive to epistemic considerations.https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/440532free willepistemic innocence |
| spellingShingle | Fabio Tollon Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief European Journal of Analytic Philosophy free will epistemic innocence |
| title | Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief |
| title_full | Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief |
| title_fullStr | Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief |
| title_full_unstemmed | Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief |
| title_short | Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief |
| title_sort | free will as an epistemically innocent false belief |
| topic | free will epistemic innocence |
| url | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/440532 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fabiotollon freewillasanepistemicallyinnocentfalsebelief |