Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief

In this paper I aim to establish that our belief in free will is epistemically innocent. Many contemporary accounts that deal with the potential “illusion” of freedom seek to describe the pragmatic benefits of belief in free will, such as how it facilitates or grounds our notions of moral responsibi...

Бүрэн тодорхойлолт

Номзүйн дэлгэрэнгүй
Үндсэн зохиолч: Fabio Tollon
Формат: Өгүүллэг
Хэл сонгох:English
Хэвлэсэн: University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 2023-01-01
Цуврал:European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
Нөхцлүүд:
Онлайн хандалт:https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/440532

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