Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief
In this paper I aim to establish that our belief in free will is epistemically innocent. Many contemporary accounts that deal with the potential “illusion” of freedom seek to describe the pragmatic benefits of belief in free will, such as how it facilitates or grounds our notions of moral responsibi...
Hoofdauteur: | Fabio Tollon |
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Formaat: | Artikel |
Taal: | English |
Gepubliceerd in: |
University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
2023-01-01
|
Reeks: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
Onderwerpen: | |
Online toegang: | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/440532 |
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