Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities
This paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is proved that the game is super-additive, and the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff. It is also proved that the model is balanced and thus, it has a nonempty core. This means there always...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IEEE
2021-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
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| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9435374/ |
| _version_ | 1797794179403743232 |
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| author | Amir Safdarian Poria Astero Marius Baranauskas Antti Keski-Koukkari Anna Kulmala |
| author_facet | Amir Safdarian Poria Astero Marius Baranauskas Antti Keski-Koukkari Anna Kulmala |
| author_sort | Amir Safdarian |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is proved that the game is super-additive, and the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff. It is also proved that the model is balanced and thus, it has a nonempty core. This means there always exists at least one value sharing mechanism that makes the grand coalition stable. Therefore, prosumers will always achieve lower bills if they join to form larger ECs. A counterexample is presented to demonstrate that the game is not convex and value sharing based on Shapley values does not necessarily ensure the stability of the coalition. To find a stabilizing value sharing mechanism that belongs to the core of the game, the worst-case excess minimization concept is applied. In this concept, however, size of the optimization problem increases exponentially with respect to the number of members in EC. To make the problem computationally tractable, the idea of clustering members based on their generation/load profiles and considering the same profile and share for members in the same cluster is proposed here. K-means algorithm is used for clustering prosumers’ profiles. This way, the problem would have several redundant constraints that can be removed. The redundant constraints are identified and removed via the generalized Llewellyn’s rules. Finally, value sharing in an apartment building in the southern part of Finland in the metropolitan area is studied to demonstrate effectiveness of the method. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-13T02:58:00Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-d3a0bec0b0c24a3d8df13f7ebea931cc |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-13T02:58:00Z |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj.art-d3a0bec0b0c24a3d8df13f7ebea931cc2023-06-27T23:01:00ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362021-01-019782667827510.1109/ACCESS.2021.30818719435374Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy CommunitiesAmir Safdarian0https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0555-8858Poria Astero1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6126-3598Marius Baranauskas2https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7176-9931Antti Keski-Koukkari3https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0490-9003Anna Kulmala4https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0051-359XVTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, FinlandVTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, FinlandVTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, FinlandVTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, FinlandVTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, FinlandThis paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is proved that the game is super-additive, and the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff. It is also proved that the model is balanced and thus, it has a nonempty core. This means there always exists at least one value sharing mechanism that makes the grand coalition stable. Therefore, prosumers will always achieve lower bills if they join to form larger ECs. A counterexample is presented to demonstrate that the game is not convex and value sharing based on Shapley values does not necessarily ensure the stability of the coalition. To find a stabilizing value sharing mechanism that belongs to the core of the game, the worst-case excess minimization concept is applied. In this concept, however, size of the optimization problem increases exponentially with respect to the number of members in EC. To make the problem computationally tractable, the idea of clustering members based on their generation/load profiles and considering the same profile and share for members in the same cluster is proposed here. K-means algorithm is used for clustering prosumers’ profiles. This way, the problem would have several redundant constraints that can be removed. The redundant constraints are identified and removed via the generalized Llewellyn’s rules. Finally, value sharing in an apartment building in the southern part of Finland in the metropolitan area is studied to demonstrate effectiveness of the method.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9435374/Coalitional game theoryenergy communityoptimization problempayoff allocationprosumerredundant constraint |
| spellingShingle | Amir Safdarian Poria Astero Marius Baranauskas Antti Keski-Koukkari Anna Kulmala Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities IEEE Access Coalitional game theory energy community optimization problem payoff allocation prosumer redundant constraint |
| title | Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities |
| title_full | Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities |
| title_fullStr | Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities |
| title_full_unstemmed | Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities |
| title_short | Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities |
| title_sort | coalitional game theory based value sharing in energy communities |
| topic | Coalitional game theory energy community optimization problem payoff allocation prosumer redundant constraint |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9435374/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT amirsafdarian coalitionalgametheorybasedvaluesharinginenergycommunities AT poriaastero coalitionalgametheorybasedvaluesharinginenergycommunities AT mariusbaranauskas coalitionalgametheorybasedvaluesharinginenergycommunities AT anttikeskikoukkari coalitionalgametheorybasedvaluesharinginenergycommunities AT annakulmala coalitionalgametheorybasedvaluesharinginenergycommunities |