| Summary: | This paper discusses the morality of make-believing deviant moral truths within the context of fictional narratives (e.g. make-believing that the killing of innocent people is a morally good thing to do). By examining popular explanations of imaginative resistance (one’s unwillingness to imagine certain fictitious content), the paper assesses the extent to which reasons for our unwillingness to entertain certain forms of pretence might constitute a form of moral wisdom, and so offer insight into what a normative approach to make-believe might look like (qua a sufficient condition for moral proscription). The paper concludes that while imaginative resistance may provide a psychological measure of what some may find insensitive or tasteless within the realm of pretence, it does not have the resources to be co-opted as a suitable measure of moral wisdom, and therefore cannot be used to guide, morally, what we should or should not be willing to make-believe.
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