Assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspective
Developments in science and technology improve health and wellbeing of humankind, for example with better methods to detect and treat diseases. However, some advances have led to the development of weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons. Although banned by international treatie...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2022-09-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frma.2022.1012355/full |
| _version_ | 1811272346633240576 |
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| author | Maximilian Brackmann Michèle Gemünden Cédric Invernizzi Stefan Mogl |
| author_facet | Maximilian Brackmann Michèle Gemünden Cédric Invernizzi Stefan Mogl |
| author_sort | Maximilian Brackmann |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Developments in science and technology improve health and wellbeing of humankind, for example with better methods to detect and treat diseases. However, some advances have led to the development of weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons. Although banned by international treaties, chemical weapons have been used in recent years in assassinations and the Syrian civil war. Additionally, biological weapons became the subject of recent suspicions and allegations. While not limited to these fields, the so-called dual-use potential—the possibility to apply aspects both with benevolent or malevolent intentions—is especially pronounced in the life sciences. Here, we showcase some areas explored at the conference series Spiez CONVERGENCE that facilitates an exchange between science, arms control and international security. Together, these communities discuss the potential impact of life scientific advances on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Enabled by digital technologies, DNA sequencing and synthesis provide the toolbox to (re)construct viruses and cells, which demonstrated invaluable during the COVID-19 pandemic but bear the misuse risk to allow intentionally triggering an outbreak. Open databases and algorithms could be used to generate new chemical weapons. We argue that preventing unintended consequences of life science research while promoting its benefits with responsible science, requires awareness and reflection about unexpected risks of everyone involved in the research process. The strength of the ban of chemical and biological weapons also depends on scientists interacting with policy makers in evaluating risks and implementing measures to reduce them. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T22:38:38Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-d50b6210d318495f8d814f33b229637e |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2504-0537 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T22:38:38Z |
| publishDate | 2022-09-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics |
| spelling | doaj.art-d50b6210d318495f8d814f33b229637e2022-12-22T03:13:47ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics2504-05372022-09-01710.3389/frma.2022.10123551012355Assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspectiveMaximilian Brackmann0Michèle Gemünden1Cédric Invernizzi2Stefan Mogl3NBC Arms Control Staff Unit, Spiez Laboratory, Federal Office for Civil Protection, Spiez, SwitzerlandCenter for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Zurich, SwitzerlandNBC Arms Control Staff Unit, Spiez Laboratory, Federal Office for Civil Protection, Spiez, SwitzerlandChemistry Division, Spiez Laboratory, Federal Office for Civil Protection, Spiez, SwitzerlandDevelopments in science and technology improve health and wellbeing of humankind, for example with better methods to detect and treat diseases. However, some advances have led to the development of weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons. Although banned by international treaties, chemical weapons have been used in recent years in assassinations and the Syrian civil war. Additionally, biological weapons became the subject of recent suspicions and allegations. While not limited to these fields, the so-called dual-use potential—the possibility to apply aspects both with benevolent or malevolent intentions—is especially pronounced in the life sciences. Here, we showcase some areas explored at the conference series Spiez CONVERGENCE that facilitates an exchange between science, arms control and international security. Together, these communities discuss the potential impact of life scientific advances on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Enabled by digital technologies, DNA sequencing and synthesis provide the toolbox to (re)construct viruses and cells, which demonstrated invaluable during the COVID-19 pandemic but bear the misuse risk to allow intentionally triggering an outbreak. Open databases and algorithms could be used to generate new chemical weapons. We argue that preventing unintended consequences of life science research while promoting its benefits with responsible science, requires awareness and reflection about unexpected risks of everyone involved in the research process. The strength of the ban of chemical and biological weapons also depends on scientists interacting with policy makers in evaluating risks and implementing measures to reduce them.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frma.2022.1012355/fulldual-useresearch of concernchemical weaponsbiological weaponsscience policysecurity policy |
| spellingShingle | Maximilian Brackmann Michèle Gemünden Cédric Invernizzi Stefan Mogl Assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspective Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics dual-use research of concern chemical weapons biological weapons science policy security policy |
| title | Assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspective |
| title_full | Assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspective |
| title_fullStr | Assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | Assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspective |
| title_short | Assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspective |
| title_sort | assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspective |
| topic | dual-use research of concern chemical weapons biological weapons science policy security policy |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frma.2022.1012355/full |
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