Detection and Localization of Data Forgery Attacks in Automatic Generation Control

Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is a key control system to maintain the power system’s balance between load and supply by maintaining its frequency in a specific range. It collects the tie-line power flow and frequency measurements of each control area to calculate the Area Control Err...

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Main Authors: Fengli Zhang, Yatish Dubasi, Wei Bao, Qinghua Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2023-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10237184/
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author Fengli Zhang
Yatish Dubasi
Wei Bao
Qinghua Li
author_facet Fengli Zhang
Yatish Dubasi
Wei Bao
Qinghua Li
author_sort Fengli Zhang
collection DOAJ
description Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is a key control system to maintain the power system’s balance between load and supply by maintaining its frequency in a specific range. It collects the tie-line power flow and frequency measurements of each control area to calculate the Area Control Error (ACE) and then adjusts power generation based on the calculated ACE. However, malicious frequency or tie-line power flow measurements can be injected and then AGC is misled to make false power generation adjustments which will harm power system operations. Such attacks can be carefully designed to pass the power system’s existing bad data detection schemes. In this work, we propose Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) neural network-based methods and a Fourier Transform-based method to detect and localize such data forgery attacks in AGC. These methods only utilize historical data, which are already available in existing AGC systems, making them easy to deploy in the real world. They learn normal data patterns from historical data and detect abnormal patterns caused by attacks. To make it easier for users to use the solution, we also propose methods to automatically find the proper detection threshold based on user needs. These methods are tested both on real and simulated datasets and show high detection and localization accuracy.
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spelling doaj.art-d604ec1253474f55a8a90a3e551eef422023-09-11T23:00:51ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362023-01-0111959999601310.1109/ACCESS.2023.331139310237184Detection and Localization of Data Forgery Attacks in Automatic Generation ControlFengli Zhang0Yatish Dubasi1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7409-0286Wei Bao2Qinghua Li3https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7734-6216Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USADepartment of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USADepartment of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USADepartment of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USAAutomatic Generation Control (AGC) is a key control system to maintain the power system’s balance between load and supply by maintaining its frequency in a specific range. It collects the tie-line power flow and frequency measurements of each control area to calculate the Area Control Error (ACE) and then adjusts power generation based on the calculated ACE. However, malicious frequency or tie-line power flow measurements can be injected and then AGC is misled to make false power generation adjustments which will harm power system operations. Such attacks can be carefully designed to pass the power system’s existing bad data detection schemes. In this work, we propose Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) neural network-based methods and a Fourier Transform-based method to detect and localize such data forgery attacks in AGC. These methods only utilize historical data, which are already available in existing AGC systems, making them easy to deploy in the real world. They learn normal data patterns from historical data and detect abnormal patterns caused by attacks. To make it easier for users to use the solution, we also propose methods to automatically find the proper detection threshold based on user needs. These methods are tested both on real and simulated datasets and show high detection and localization accuracy.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10237184/Power gridautomatic generation controldata forgerydeep learningattack detectionattack localization
spellingShingle Fengli Zhang
Yatish Dubasi
Wei Bao
Qinghua Li
Detection and Localization of Data Forgery Attacks in Automatic Generation Control
IEEE Access
Power grid
automatic generation control
data forgery
deep learning
attack detection
attack localization
title Detection and Localization of Data Forgery Attacks in Automatic Generation Control
title_full Detection and Localization of Data Forgery Attacks in Automatic Generation Control
title_fullStr Detection and Localization of Data Forgery Attacks in Automatic Generation Control
title_full_unstemmed Detection and Localization of Data Forgery Attacks in Automatic Generation Control
title_short Detection and Localization of Data Forgery Attacks in Automatic Generation Control
title_sort detection and localization of data forgery attacks in automatic generation control
topic Power grid
automatic generation control
data forgery
deep learning
attack detection
attack localization
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10237184/
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AT yatishdubasi detectionandlocalizationofdataforgeryattacksinautomaticgenerationcontrol
AT weibao detectionandlocalizationofdataforgeryattacksinautomaticgenerationcontrol
AT qinghuali detectionandlocalizationofdataforgeryattacksinautomaticgenerationcontrol