How Did Evil Come into the World? A Primordial Free-Will Theodicy
James P. Sterba has provided a compelling argument to the effect that given the extent of significant, and indeed even horrendous, evil that an all-good and all-powerful being could have prevented, there is no God. There is a hidden assumption in Sterba’s reasoning, involving an inference from God b...
Main Author: | Mark Johnston |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2023-03-01
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Series: | Religions |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/3/402 |
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