A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion
In this perspective, we follow the idea that an integration of cognitive models with sensorimotor theories of compulsion is required to understand the subjective experience of compulsive action. We argue that cognitive biases in obsessive–compulsive disorder may obscure an altered momentary, pre-ref...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2021-02-01
|
| Series: | Brain Sciences |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3425/11/2/182 |
| _version_ | 1797416326600327168 |
|---|---|
| author | Stefan Schmidt Gerd Wagner Martin Walter Max-Philipp Stenner |
| author_facet | Stefan Schmidt Gerd Wagner Martin Walter Max-Philipp Stenner |
| author_sort | Stefan Schmidt |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this perspective, we follow the idea that an integration of cognitive models with sensorimotor theories of compulsion is required to understand the subjective experience of compulsive action. We argue that cognitive biases in obsessive–compulsive disorder may obscure an altered momentary, pre-reflective experience of sensorimotor control, whose detection thus requires an implicit experimental operationalization. We propose that a classic psychophysical test exists that provides this implicit operationalization, i.e., the intentional binding paradigm. We show how intentional binding can pit two ideas against each other that are fundamental to current sensorimotor theories of compulsion, i.e., the idea of excessive conscious monitoring of action, and the idea that patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder compensate for diminished conscious access to “internal states”, including states of the body, by relying on more readily observable proxies. Following these ideas, we develop concrete, testable hypotheses on how intentional binding changes under the assumption of different sensorimotor theories of compulsion. Furthermore, we demonstrate how intentional binding provides a touchstone for predictive coding accounts of obsessive–compulsive disorder. A thorough empirical test of the hypotheses developed in this perspective could help explain the puzzling, disabling phenomenon of compulsion, with implications for the normal subjective experience of human action. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T06:01:43Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-d6f56139d998446687051d8f7973822d |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2076-3425 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T06:01:43Z |
| publishDate | 2021-02-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Brain Sciences |
| spelling | doaj.art-d6f56139d998446687051d8f7973822d2023-12-03T12:08:41ZengMDPI AGBrain Sciences2076-34252021-02-0111218210.3390/brainsci11020182A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of CompulsionStefan Schmidt0Gerd Wagner1Martin Walter2Max-Philipp Stenner3Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Jena University Hospital, 07743 Jena, GermanyDepartment of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Jena University Hospital, 07743 Jena, GermanyDepartment of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Jena University Hospital, 07743 Jena, GermanyDepartment of Behavioral Neurology, Leibniz Institute for Neurobiology, 39118 Magdeburg, GermanyIn this perspective, we follow the idea that an integration of cognitive models with sensorimotor theories of compulsion is required to understand the subjective experience of compulsive action. We argue that cognitive biases in obsessive–compulsive disorder may obscure an altered momentary, pre-reflective experience of sensorimotor control, whose detection thus requires an implicit experimental operationalization. We propose that a classic psychophysical test exists that provides this implicit operationalization, i.e., the intentional binding paradigm. We show how intentional binding can pit two ideas against each other that are fundamental to current sensorimotor theories of compulsion, i.e., the idea of excessive conscious monitoring of action, and the idea that patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder compensate for diminished conscious access to “internal states”, including states of the body, by relying on more readily observable proxies. Following these ideas, we develop concrete, testable hypotheses on how intentional binding changes under the assumption of different sensorimotor theories of compulsion. Furthermore, we demonstrate how intentional binding provides a touchstone for predictive coding accounts of obsessive–compulsive disorder. A thorough empirical test of the hypotheses developed in this perspective could help explain the puzzling, disabling phenomenon of compulsion, with implications for the normal subjective experience of human action.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3425/11/2/182obsessive–compulsive disordersense of agencyintentional bindingcue integration |
| spellingShingle | Stefan Schmidt Gerd Wagner Martin Walter Max-Philipp Stenner A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion Brain Sciences obsessive–compulsive disorder sense of agency intentional binding cue integration |
| title | A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion |
| title_full | A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion |
| title_fullStr | A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion |
| title_short | A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion |
| title_sort | psychophysical window onto the subjective experience of compulsion |
| topic | obsessive–compulsive disorder sense of agency intentional binding cue integration |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3425/11/2/182 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stefanschmidt apsychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion AT gerdwagner apsychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion AT martinwalter apsychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion AT maxphilippstenner apsychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion AT stefanschmidt psychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion AT gerdwagner psychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion AT martinwalter psychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion AT maxphilippstenner psychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion |