Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem
<p>The Disjunction Problem states that teleological theories of perception cannot explain why a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without a suitable answer, non-veridical represen...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of the Basque Country
2015-06-01
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| Series: | Theoria |
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| Online Access: | http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/11008 |
| Summary: | <p>The Disjunction Problem states that teleological theories of perception cannot explain why a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without a suitable answer, non-veridical representation becomes impossible to explain. Here, I defend Burge’s teleological theory of perception against the Disjunction Problem, arguing that a perceptual state’s representing a disjunctive property is incompatible with perceptual anti-individualism. Because anti-individualism is at the heart of Burge’s theory, I conclude that Burgeans need not be concerned with the Disjunction Problem.</p> |
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| ISSN: | 0495-4548 2171-679X |