Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental Analysis

<p>This study compares the use of forward-looking and contemporary performance measurement in incentive contracts in the presence of the horizon problem. To do this, we used a single-factor experiment between pre- and post-treatment subjects, with a control group. The study had the participati...

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Main Author: Luis Paulo Guimarães dos Santos
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade de São Paulo 2015-08-01
Series:Revista Contabilidade & Finanças
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1519-70772015000200195&lng=en&tlng=en
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author Luis Paulo Guimarães dos Santos
author_facet Luis Paulo Guimarães dos Santos
author_sort Luis Paulo Guimarães dos Santos
collection DOAJ
description <p>This study compares the use of forward-looking and contemporary performance measurement in incentive contracts in the presence of the horizon problem. To do this, we used a single-factor experiment between pre- and post-treatment subjects, with a control group. The study had the participation of 76 undergraduate students, divided into 3 groups, and it registered that, when compared to the control group and the treatment group linked to contemporary performance measurement, the participants under the contract that rewarded having a forward-looking measurement as a basis acted more congruently with the long-term goal set for the experimental task. Consistent with predictions of the agency theory, the main finding of this research suggests that economic profit helps mitigating the problem of manage rial myopia, indicating that incorporate it to contracts motivates agents to act more consistently with the company's long-term goals, even in the presence of the horizon problem. Besides, the study registered new evidence of the inadequacy of formulating incentive contracts having distorted performance measurements as a basis, such as book profit.</p>
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spelling doaj.art-d7cdc3e790204c0795fa26c53abfd5ce2022-12-22T02:40:53ZengUniversidade de São PauloRevista Contabilidade & Finanças1808-057X2015-08-01266819520710.1590/1808-057x201501060S1519-70772015000200195Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental AnalysisLuis Paulo Guimarães dos Santos<p>This study compares the use of forward-looking and contemporary performance measurement in incentive contracts in the presence of the horizon problem. To do this, we used a single-factor experiment between pre- and post-treatment subjects, with a control group. The study had the participation of 76 undergraduate students, divided into 3 groups, and it registered that, when compared to the control group and the treatment group linked to contemporary performance measurement, the participants under the contract that rewarded having a forward-looking measurement as a basis acted more congruently with the long-term goal set for the experimental task. Consistent with predictions of the agency theory, the main finding of this research suggests that economic profit helps mitigating the problem of manage rial myopia, indicating that incorporate it to contracts motivates agents to act more consistently with the company's long-term goals, even in the presence of the horizon problem. Besides, the study registered new evidence of the inadequacy of formulating incentive contracts having distorted performance measurements as a basis, such as book profit.</p>http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1519-70772015000200195&lng=en&tlng=encontratos de incentivomensuração de desempenhoproblema do horizonte
spellingShingle Luis Paulo Guimarães dos Santos
Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental Analysis
Revista Contabilidade & Finanças
contratos de incentivo
mensuração de desempenho
problema do horizonte
title Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental Analysis
title_full Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental Analysis
title_fullStr Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental Analysis
title_full_unstemmed Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental Analysis
title_short Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental Analysis
title_sort comparing the use of forward looking and contemporary performance measurement to formulate incentive contracts in the presence of the horizon problem an experimental analysis
topic contratos de incentivo
mensuração de desempenho
problema do horizonte
url http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1519-70772015000200195&lng=en&tlng=en
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