Power-Efficient Secure Transmission Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropper: A Game-Theoretic Framework
Information security is of paramount importance yet significant challenge for wireless communications. In this paper, we investigate the power-efficient transmissions with security concerns in the presence of a full-duplex (FD) active eavesdropper. With FD capability, the eavesdropper can launch jam...
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| Materiálatiipa: | Artihkal |
| Giella: | English |
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IEEE
2017-01-01
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| Ráidu: | IEEE Access |
| Fáttát: | |
| Liŋkkat: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8086124/ |
| _version_ | 1831521623886266368 |
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| author | Xiao Tang Pinyi Ren Zhu Han |
| author_facet | Xiao Tang Pinyi Ren Zhu Han |
| author_sort | Xiao Tang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Information security is of paramount importance yet significant challenge for wireless communications. In this paper, we investigate the power-efficient transmissions with security concerns in the presence of a full-duplex (FD) active eavesdropper. With FD capability, the eavesdropper can launch jamming attacks while eavesdropping, which affects the legitimate transmissions, such that the legitimate power allocation becomes more favorable for eavesdropping. However, the jamming attacks require additional power consumption and result in self-interference at the eavesdropper itself. The legitimate user intends for a power-efficient manner to effectively guarantee the secure transmissions to defend against the simultaneous eavesdropping and jamming attacks. We formulate the problem within a Stackelberg game framework, where the eavesdropper takes action first as the leader and the legitimate user acts as the follower. We analyze the security game model for both single-channel and multi-channel cases. Furthermore, by exploring the properties of the game equilibrium, we propose the optimal transmission strategy and jamming strategy for the legitimate transmission and eavesdropping, respectively. Finally, we provide extensive simulation results to corroborate our theoretical analysis and evaluate the security performance. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-13T23:28:29Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-d8c9136039b9459e809f964af2d1d462 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-13T23:28:29Z |
| publishDate | 2017-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj.art-d8c9136039b9459e809f964af2d1d4622022-12-21T23:27:29ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362017-01-015246322464510.1109/ACCESS.2017.27672838086124Power-Efficient Secure Transmission Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropper: A Game-Theoretic FrameworkXiao Tang0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8971-5413Pinyi Ren1Zhu Han2School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, ChinaSchool of Electronics and Information Engineering, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, ChinaDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USAInformation security is of paramount importance yet significant challenge for wireless communications. In this paper, we investigate the power-efficient transmissions with security concerns in the presence of a full-duplex (FD) active eavesdropper. With FD capability, the eavesdropper can launch jamming attacks while eavesdropping, which affects the legitimate transmissions, such that the legitimate power allocation becomes more favorable for eavesdropping. However, the jamming attacks require additional power consumption and result in self-interference at the eavesdropper itself. The legitimate user intends for a power-efficient manner to effectively guarantee the secure transmissions to defend against the simultaneous eavesdropping and jamming attacks. We formulate the problem within a Stackelberg game framework, where the eavesdropper takes action first as the leader and the legitimate user acts as the follower. We analyze the security game model for both single-channel and multi-channel cases. Furthermore, by exploring the properties of the game equilibrium, we propose the optimal transmission strategy and jamming strategy for the legitimate transmission and eavesdropping, respectively. Finally, we provide extensive simulation results to corroborate our theoretical analysis and evaluate the security performance.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8086124/Physical layer securityfull-duplexactive eavesdropperStackelberg gameequilibrium |
| spellingShingle | Xiao Tang Pinyi Ren Zhu Han Power-Efficient Secure Transmission Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropper: A Game-Theoretic Framework IEEE Access Physical layer security full-duplex active eavesdropper Stackelberg game equilibrium |
| title | Power-Efficient Secure Transmission Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropper: A Game-Theoretic Framework |
| title_full | Power-Efficient Secure Transmission Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropper: A Game-Theoretic Framework |
| title_fullStr | Power-Efficient Secure Transmission Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropper: A Game-Theoretic Framework |
| title_full_unstemmed | Power-Efficient Secure Transmission Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropper: A Game-Theoretic Framework |
| title_short | Power-Efficient Secure Transmission Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropper: A Game-Theoretic Framework |
| title_sort | power efficient secure transmission against full duplex active eavesdropper a game theoretic framework |
| topic | Physical layer security full-duplex active eavesdropper Stackelberg game equilibrium |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8086124/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT xiaotang powerefficientsecuretransmissionagainstfullduplexactiveeavesdropperagametheoreticframework AT pinyiren powerefficientsecuretransmissionagainstfullduplexactiveeavesdropperagametheoreticframework AT zhuhan powerefficientsecuretransmissionagainstfullduplexactiveeavesdropperagametheoreticframework |