Davidson’s antirealism?
Frederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Editora Universitária Champagnat - PUCPRESS
2015-04-01
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| Series: | Revista de Filosofia |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/article/view/697 |
| _version_ | 1797334894185021440 |
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| author | Alexander Miller Ali Hossein Khani |
| author_facet | Alexander Miller Ali Hossein Khani |
| author_sort | Alexander Miller |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Frederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland’s argument is a failure. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T08:28:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-da7b2d8cdbd54c02bc96fc0d9264c951 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0104-4443 1980-5934 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T08:28:52Z |
| publishDate | 2015-04-01 |
| publisher | Editora Universitária Champagnat - PUCPRESS |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Revista de Filosofia |
| spelling | doaj.art-da7b2d8cdbd54c02bc96fc0d9264c9512024-02-02T04:08:28ZengEditora Universitária Champagnat - PUCPRESSRevista de Filosofia0104-44431980-59342015-04-01274026527610.7213/aurora.27.040.AO01697Davidson’s antirealism?Alexander Miller0Ali Hossein Khani1University of Otago, Department of Philosophy, Dunedin, New ZealandUniversity of Otago, Department of Philosophy, Dunedin, New ZealandFrederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland’s argument is a failure.https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/article/view/697 |
| spellingShingle | Alexander Miller Ali Hossein Khani Davidson’s antirealism? Revista de Filosofia |
| title | Davidson’s antirealism? |
| title_full | Davidson’s antirealism? |
| title_fullStr | Davidson’s antirealism? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Davidson’s antirealism? |
| title_short | Davidson’s antirealism? |
| title_sort | davidson s antirealism |
| url | https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/article/view/697 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alexandermiller davidsonsantirealism AT alihosseinkhani davidsonsantirealism |