Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense
The aim of this paper is to show that a corollary of resolute readings of Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense cannot be sustained. First, I describe the corollary. Next, I point out the relevance to it of Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance concepts. Then, I survey some typical uses of...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MULPress
2020-11-01
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| Series: | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4190 |
| _version_ | 1798024023167205376 |
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| author | Joseph Ulatowski |
| author_facet | Joseph Ulatowski |
| author_sort | Joseph Ulatowski |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The aim of this paper is to show that a corollary of resolute readings of Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense cannot be sustained. First, I describe the corollary. Next, I point out the relevance to it of Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance concepts. Then, I survey some typical uses of nonsense to see what they bring to an ordinary language treatment of the word “nonsense” and its relatives. I will subsequently consider the objection, on behalf of a resolute reading, that “nonsense” is a term of philosophical criticism. Finally, I conclude that resolute readings have not sufficiently accounted for how nonsense behaves in our language; they have failed to heed Wittgenstein’s warning: “don’t think, but look!” |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T17:55:56Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-db4e18d0e73348c59dd6314ad8bf1f9c |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2159-0303 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T17:55:56Z |
| publishDate | 2020-11-01 |
| publisher | MULPress |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj.art-db4e18d0e73348c59dd6314ad8bf1f9c2022-12-22T04:10:48ZengMULPressJournal for the History of Analytical Philosophy2159-03032020-11-0181010.15173/jhap.v8i10.4190Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and NonsenseJoseph Ulatowski0University of WaikatoThe aim of this paper is to show that a corollary of resolute readings of Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense cannot be sustained. First, I describe the corollary. Next, I point out the relevance to it of Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance concepts. Then, I survey some typical uses of nonsense to see what they bring to an ordinary language treatment of the word “nonsense” and its relatives. I will subsequently consider the objection, on behalf of a resolute reading, that “nonsense” is a term of philosophical criticism. Finally, I conclude that resolute readings have not sufficiently accounted for how nonsense behaves in our language; they have failed to heed Wittgenstein’s warning: “don’t think, but look!”https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4190 |
| spellingShingle | Joseph Ulatowski Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| title | Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense |
| title_full | Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense |
| title_fullStr | Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense |
| title_full_unstemmed | Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense |
| title_short | Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense |
| title_sort | resolute readings of wittgenstein and nonsense |
| url | https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4190 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT josephulatowski resolutereadingsofwittgensteinandnonsense |