Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense
The aim of this paper is to show that a corollary of resolute readings of Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense cannot be sustained. First, I describe the corollary. Next, I point out the relevance to it of Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance concepts. Then, I survey some typical uses of...
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| Μορφή: | Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
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MULPress
2020-11-01
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| Σειρά: | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4190 |