An experimental guide to vehicles in the park
Prescriptive rules guide human behavior across various domains of community life, including law, morality, and etiquette. What, specifically, are rules in the eyes of their subjects, i.e., those who are expected to abide by them? Over the last sixty years, theorists in the philosophy of law have of...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2020-05-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.sjdm.org/19/191125/jdm191125.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797724718230405120 |
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| author | Noel Struchiner Ivar R. Hannikainen Guilherme da F. C. F. de Almeida |
| author_facet | Noel Struchiner Ivar R. Hannikainen Guilherme da F. C. F. de Almeida |
| author_sort | Noel Struchiner |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Prescriptive rules
guide human behavior across various domains of community life, including law,
morality, and etiquette. What, specifically, are rules in the eyes of their
subjects, i.e., those who are expected to abide by them? Over the last sixty
years, theorists in the philosophy of law have offered a useful framework with
which to consider this question. Some, following H. L. A. Hart, argue that a
rule’s text at least sometimes suffices to determine whether the rule itself
covers a case. Others, in the spirit of Lon Fuller, believe that there is no
way to understand a rule without invoking its purpose --- the benevolent ends
which it is meant to advance. In this paper we ask whether people associate
rules with their textual formulation or their underlying purpose. We find that
both text and purpose guide people's reasoning about the scope of a rule.
Overall, a rule’s text more strongly contributed to rule infraction decisions
than did its purpose. The balance of these considerations, however, varied
across experimental conditions: In conditions favoring a spontaneous judgment,
rule interpretation was affected by moral purposes, whereas analytic conditions
resulted in a greater adherence to textual interpretations. In sum, our
findings suggest that the philosophical debate between textualism and
purposivism partly reflects two broader approaches to normative reasoning that
vary within and across individuals. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T10:21:08Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-db61ba7b19be4c1b9d44c01665f16961 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T10:21:08Z |
| publishDate | 2020-05-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-db61ba7b19be4c1b9d44c01665f169612023-09-02T10:09:21ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752020-05-01153312329An experimental guide to vehicles in the parkNoel StruchinerIvar R. HannikainenGuilherme da F. C. F. de AlmeidaPrescriptive rules guide human behavior across various domains of community life, including law, morality, and etiquette. What, specifically, are rules in the eyes of their subjects, i.e., those who are expected to abide by them? Over the last sixty years, theorists in the philosophy of law have offered a useful framework with which to consider this question. Some, following H. L. A. Hart, argue that a rule’s text at least sometimes suffices to determine whether the rule itself covers a case. Others, in the spirit of Lon Fuller, believe that there is no way to understand a rule without invoking its purpose --- the benevolent ends which it is meant to advance. In this paper we ask whether people associate rules with their textual formulation or their underlying purpose. We find that both text and purpose guide people's reasoning about the scope of a rule. Overall, a rule’s text more strongly contributed to rule infraction decisions than did its purpose. The balance of these considerations, however, varied across experimental conditions: In conditions favoring a spontaneous judgment, rule interpretation was affected by moral purposes, whereas analytic conditions resulted in a greater adherence to textual interpretations. In sum, our findings suggest that the philosophical debate between textualism and purposivism partly reflects two broader approaches to normative reasoning that vary within and across individuals.http://journal.sjdm.org/19/191125/jdm191125.pdfexperimental jurisprudence the concept of law rules legal psychology hart fuller.nakeywords |
| spellingShingle | Noel Struchiner Ivar R. Hannikainen Guilherme da F. C. F. de Almeida An experimental guide to vehicles in the park Judgment and Decision Making experimental jurisprudence the concept of law rules legal psychology hart fuller.nakeywords |
| title | An experimental
guide to vehicles in the park |
| title_full | An experimental
guide to vehicles in the park |
| title_fullStr | An experimental
guide to vehicles in the park |
| title_full_unstemmed | An experimental
guide to vehicles in the park |
| title_short | An experimental
guide to vehicles in the park |
| title_sort | experimental guide to vehicles in the park |
| topic | experimental jurisprudence the concept of law rules legal psychology hart fuller.nakeywords |
| url | http://journal.sjdm.org/19/191125/jdm191125.pdf |
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