Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory Agencies
Is there Executive interference in the regulatory agencies after its formal establishment as independent bodies? Under what conditions the Executive chooses to interfere in the agencies? This paper analyses the degree of interference in Brazilian national regulatory agencies and provide a tentative...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Brazilian Political Science Association
2011-12-01
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| Series: | Brazilian Political Science Review |
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| Online Access: | http://www.bpsr.org.br/index.php/bpsr/article/download/125/116 |
| _version_ | 1811309704550285312 |
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| author | Mariana Batista da Silva |
| author_facet | Mariana Batista da Silva |
| author_sort | Mariana Batista da Silva |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Is there Executive interference in the regulatory agencies after its formal establishment as independent bodies? Under what conditions the Executive chooses to interfere in the agencies? This paper analyses the degree of interference in Brazilian national regulatory agencies and provide a tentative explanation for the variation in the degree of interference. The basic hypotheses is that credibility costs, the degree of formal independence and the preferences of presidents are crucial factors affecting the extent to which presidents interfere in the regulatory process. A random effects model is estimated with panel data for the period between 1997 and 2008 covering ten national agencies. The degree of interference is operationalized by an index built using factor analysis. The data suggest that there is political interference, which varies across agencies and over time. The results show that the preferences of the president and some issue area specificity matters for the choice that presidents make regarding the interference in the regulatory process. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T09:46:06Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-dbb804a655294be08c662c8c74541553 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1981-3821 1981-3821 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T09:46:06Z |
| publishDate | 2011-12-01 |
| publisher | Brazilian Political Science Association |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Brazilian Political Science Review |
| spelling | doaj.art-dbb804a655294be08c662c8c745415532022-12-22T02:51:46ZengBrazilian Political Science AssociationBrazilian Political Science Review1981-38211981-38212011-12-01523974Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory AgenciesMariana Batista da Silva0UFPEIs there Executive interference in the regulatory agencies after its formal establishment as independent bodies? Under what conditions the Executive chooses to interfere in the agencies? This paper analyses the degree of interference in Brazilian national regulatory agencies and provide a tentative explanation for the variation in the degree of interference. The basic hypotheses is that credibility costs, the degree of formal independence and the preferences of presidents are crucial factors affecting the extent to which presidents interfere in the regulatory process. A random effects model is estimated with panel data for the period between 1997 and 2008 covering ten national agencies. The degree of interference is operationalized by an index built using factor analysis. The data suggest that there is political interference, which varies across agencies and over time. The results show that the preferences of the president and some issue area specificity matters for the choice that presidents make regarding the interference in the regulatory process.http://www.bpsr.org.br/index.php/bpsr/article/download/125/116Delegationindependenceregulationpolitical interference |
| spellingShingle | Mariana Batista da Silva Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory Agencies Brazilian Political Science Review Delegation independence regulation political interference |
| title | Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory Agencies |
| title_full | Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory Agencies |
| title_fullStr | Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory Agencies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory Agencies |
| title_short | Independence After Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political interference in Brazilian regulatory Agencies |
| title_sort | independence after delegation presidential calculus and political interference in brazilian regulatory agencies |
| topic | Delegation independence regulation political interference |
| url | http://www.bpsr.org.br/index.php/bpsr/article/download/125/116 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT marianabatistadasilva independenceafterdelegationpresidentialcalculusandpoliticalinterferenceinbrazilianregulatoryagencies |