Representing Vague Opinion

Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly expl...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Daniel J. McKaughan, John M. Drake
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2013-02-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/26323
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author Daniel J. McKaughan
John M. Drake
author_facet Daniel J. McKaughan
John M. Drake
author_sort Daniel J. McKaughan
collection DOAJ
description Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. Any empirically adequate account of our actual judgments must reckon with the fact that these are typically neither uniform through the range of outcomes we take to be serious possibilities nor abrupt at the edges.
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spelling doaj.art-dbd6e5138886490e9079729f66287e242022-12-21T18:59:54ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112013-02-0116234134410.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p34119707Representing Vague OpinionDaniel J. McKaughan0John M. Drake1Boston CollegeUniversity of GeorgiaCurrent supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. Any empirically adequate account of our actual judgments must reckon with the fact that these are typically neither uniform through the range of outcomes we take to be serious possibilities nor abrupt at the edges.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/26323Beliefmodels of opinionsubjective probabilitysupervaluationuncertaintyvan Fraassenvagueness
spellingShingle Daniel J. McKaughan
John M. Drake
Representing Vague Opinion
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Belief
models of opinion
subjective probability
supervaluation
uncertainty
van Fraassen
vagueness
title Representing Vague Opinion
title_full Representing Vague Opinion
title_fullStr Representing Vague Opinion
title_full_unstemmed Representing Vague Opinion
title_short Representing Vague Opinion
title_sort representing vague opinion
topic Belief
models of opinion
subjective probability
supervaluation
uncertainty
van Fraassen
vagueness
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/26323
work_keys_str_mv AT danieljmckaughan representingvagueopinion
AT johnmdrake representingvagueopinion