Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework
This paper focuses on the question of whether and, if so, when people can be responsible for their self-deception and its consequences. On Intentionalist accounts, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves, and it is easy to see how they can be responsible. On Motivationist accounts, in contra...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente
2012-02-01
|
| Series: | Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/197 |
| _version_ | 1818472374076440576 |
|---|---|
| author | Dana Kay Nelkin |
| author_facet | Dana Kay Nelkin |
| author_sort | Dana Kay Nelkin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper focuses on the question of whether and, if so, when people can be responsible for their self-deception and its consequences. On Intentionalist accounts, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves, and it is easy to see how they can be responsible. On Motivationist accounts, in contrast, self-deception is a motivated, but not intentional, and possibly unconscious process, making it more difficult to see how self-deceivers could be responsible. I argue that a particular Motivationist account, the Desire to Believe account, together with other resources, best explains how there can be culpable self-deception. In the process, I also show how self-deception is a good test case for deciding important questions about the nature of moral responsibility. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-14T04:06:29Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-dbea2825398e4e3cb20a54b6eff2b8d3 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1972-1293 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-14T04:06:29Z |
| publishDate | 2012-02-01 |
| publisher | Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies |
| spelling | doaj.art-dbea2825398e4e3cb20a54b6eff2b8d32022-12-22T02:13:20ZengAssociazione Culturale Humana.MenteHumana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies1972-12932012-02-01520Responsibility and Self-Deception: A FrameworkDana Kay Nelkin0University of California, San Diego, USAThis paper focuses on the question of whether and, if so, when people can be responsible for their self-deception and its consequences. On Intentionalist accounts, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves, and it is easy to see how they can be responsible. On Motivationist accounts, in contrast, self-deception is a motivated, but not intentional, and possibly unconscious process, making it more difficult to see how self-deceivers could be responsible. I argue that a particular Motivationist account, the Desire to Believe account, together with other resources, best explains how there can be culpable self-deception. In the process, I also show how self-deception is a good test case for deciding important questions about the nature of moral responsibility.http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/197self-deceptionmoral responsibilitymotivationist account |
| spellingShingle | Dana Kay Nelkin Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies self-deception moral responsibility motivationist account |
| title | Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework |
| title_full | Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework |
| title_fullStr | Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework |
| title_full_unstemmed | Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework |
| title_short | Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework |
| title_sort | responsibility and self deception a framework |
| topic | self-deception moral responsibility motivationist account |
| url | http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/197 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT danakaynelkin responsibilityandselfdeceptionaframework |