An evolutionary game study on the cooperation behavior of the “government, banks, and guarantee institutions” in financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities
“Government, bank, and guarantee institution” cooperative financing guarantee (hereinafter referred to as the cooperation mechanism) is an important way to alleviate the financing difficulties of China’s new agricultural entities and raise the credit line of bank financing. In order to find an effec...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2023-03-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Physics |
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| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphy.2023.1121374/full |
| _version_ | 1811158407626883072 |
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| author | Jingjing Zhang Zhu Mei Fan Zhang QiaoMei Zhou |
| author_facet | Jingjing Zhang Zhu Mei Fan Zhang QiaoMei Zhou |
| author_sort | Jingjing Zhang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | “Government, bank, and guarantee institution” cooperative financing guarantee (hereinafter referred to as the cooperation mechanism) is an important way to alleviate the financing difficulties of China’s new agricultural entities and raise the credit line of bank financing. In order to find an effective way for the improvement of low-level equilibrium in the actual operation of the cooperation mechanism, this study builds a three-party evolutionary game model using the local government, banks, and agricultural guarantee institutions, with incomplete information on all partners of the cooperation mechanism as the study object. This model focuses on the weak activeness, strong dependence, poor cooperation effect, lower credit line of guarantee, and other specific problems. Moreover, this study analyzes the equilibrium solution of this model and extracts the significant factors affecting the positive cooperation behaviors of the three parties (government, banks, and guarantee institutions) in the view of interest realization. Analog simulation is performed to explore the key conditions for truly alleviating the financing risks of new agricultural entities, thus helping improve the operation quality of the cooperation mechanism. According to the study results, the focus of “government, bank, and guarantee institution” cooperation should be shifted from post risk sharing to prior risk identification. Specifically, the government should further share high-quality information affiliated with farmland management rights and reflecting the status of risks; guide banks and agricultural guarantee institutions should share the cost of risk identification, accelerate the acquisition of higher information transformation value, and prevent the “free rider problem.” In the last part, policies are recommended in four aspects, including risk information sharing, risk identification quality improvement, risk identification cost sharing, and risk information value transformation, which have practical guiding significance for the sustainable development of “government, bank, and guarantee institution” financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-10T05:22:56Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-dc59cebc2df740b5aac989f7fa01928a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2296-424X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-10T05:22:56Z |
| publishDate | 2023-03-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
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| series | Frontiers in Physics |
| spelling | doaj.art-dc59cebc2df740b5aac989f7fa01928a2023-03-08T06:03:02ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Physics2296-424X2023-03-011110.3389/fphy.2023.11213741121374An evolutionary game study on the cooperation behavior of the “government, banks, and guarantee institutions” in financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entitiesJingjing ZhangZhu MeiFan ZhangQiaoMei Zhou“Government, bank, and guarantee institution” cooperative financing guarantee (hereinafter referred to as the cooperation mechanism) is an important way to alleviate the financing difficulties of China’s new agricultural entities and raise the credit line of bank financing. In order to find an effective way for the improvement of low-level equilibrium in the actual operation of the cooperation mechanism, this study builds a three-party evolutionary game model using the local government, banks, and agricultural guarantee institutions, with incomplete information on all partners of the cooperation mechanism as the study object. This model focuses on the weak activeness, strong dependence, poor cooperation effect, lower credit line of guarantee, and other specific problems. Moreover, this study analyzes the equilibrium solution of this model and extracts the significant factors affecting the positive cooperation behaviors of the three parties (government, banks, and guarantee institutions) in the view of interest realization. Analog simulation is performed to explore the key conditions for truly alleviating the financing risks of new agricultural entities, thus helping improve the operation quality of the cooperation mechanism. According to the study results, the focus of “government, bank, and guarantee institution” cooperation should be shifted from post risk sharing to prior risk identification. Specifically, the government should further share high-quality information affiliated with farmland management rights and reflecting the status of risks; guide banks and agricultural guarantee institutions should share the cost of risk identification, accelerate the acquisition of higher information transformation value, and prevent the “free rider problem.” In the last part, policies are recommended in four aspects, including risk information sharing, risk identification quality improvement, risk identification cost sharing, and risk information value transformation, which have practical guiding significance for the sustainable development of “government, bank, and guarantee institution” financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphy.2023.1121374/fullcooperation behaviorfinancing guaranteeChina’s new agricultural entitieslow-level equilibriumevolutionary game |
| spellingShingle | Jingjing Zhang Zhu Mei Fan Zhang QiaoMei Zhou An evolutionary game study on the cooperation behavior of the “government, banks, and guarantee institutions” in financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities Frontiers in Physics cooperation behavior financing guarantee China’s new agricultural entities low-level equilibrium evolutionary game |
| title | An evolutionary game study on the cooperation behavior of the “government, banks, and guarantee institutions” in financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities |
| title_full | An evolutionary game study on the cooperation behavior of the “government, banks, and guarantee institutions” in financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities |
| title_fullStr | An evolutionary game study on the cooperation behavior of the “government, banks, and guarantee institutions” in financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities |
| title_full_unstemmed | An evolutionary game study on the cooperation behavior of the “government, banks, and guarantee institutions” in financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities |
| title_short | An evolutionary game study on the cooperation behavior of the “government, banks, and guarantee institutions” in financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities |
| title_sort | evolutionary game study on the cooperation behavior of the government banks and guarantee institutions in financing guarantee for china s new agricultural entities |
| topic | cooperation behavior financing guarantee China’s new agricultural entities low-level equilibrium evolutionary game |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphy.2023.1121374/full |
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