Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest
The current study tested the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making by increasing cognitive load. This manipulation is believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue, reduces the cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias to occur. As telling a lie is believed to be more cognitivel...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2014-05-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.sjdm.org/13/131120/jdm131120.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797723513831817216 |
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| author | Anna E. van 't Veer Mariëlle Stel Ilja van Beest |
| author_facet | Anna E. van 't Veer Mariëlle Stel Ilja van Beest |
| author_sort | Anna E. van 't Veer |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The current study tested
the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making by increasing cognitive
load. This manipulation is believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue,
reduces the cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias to occur. As
telling a lie is believed to be more cognitively taxing than telling the truth,
we hypothesized that participants would be more honest under high cognitive
load than low cognitive load. 173 participants anonymously rolled a die three
times and reported their outcomes --- of which one of the rolls would be paid
out --- while either under high or low cognitive load. For the roll that
determined pay, participants under low cognitive load, but not under high
cognitive load, reported die rolls that were significantly different from a
uniform (honest) distribution. The reported outcome of this roll was also
significantly higher in the low load condition than in the high load condition,
suggesting that participants in the low load condition lied to get higher pay.
This pattern was not observed for the second and third roll where participants
knew the rolls were not going to be paid out and where therefore lying would
not serve self-interest. Results thus indicate that having limited cognitive
capacity will unveil a tendency to be honest in a situation where having more
cognitive capacity would have enabled one to serve self-interest by
lying. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T10:02:50Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-dceca6233ecb47488d7960f0619d43a3 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T10:02:50Z |
| publishDate | 2014-05-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-dceca6233ecb47488d7960f0619d43a32023-09-02T11:31:21ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752014-05-0193199206Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonestAnna E. van 't VeerMariëlle Stel Ilja van Beest The current study tested the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making by increasing cognitive load. This manipulation is believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue, reduces the cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias to occur. As telling a lie is believed to be more cognitively taxing than telling the truth, we hypothesized that participants would be more honest under high cognitive load than low cognitive load. 173 participants anonymously rolled a die three times and reported their outcomes --- of which one of the rolls would be paid out --- while either under high or low cognitive load. For the roll that determined pay, participants under low cognitive load, but not under high cognitive load, reported die rolls that were significantly different from a uniform (honest) distribution. The reported outcome of this roll was also significantly higher in the low load condition than in the high load condition, suggesting that participants in the low load condition lied to get higher pay. This pattern was not observed for the second and third roll where participants knew the rolls were not going to be paid out and where therefore lying would not serve self-interest. Results thus indicate that having limited cognitive capacity will unveil a tendency to be honest in a situation where having more cognitive capacity would have enabled one to serve self-interest by lying.http://journal.sjdm.org/13/131120/jdm131120.pdfdeception cognitive processing capacity morality dualsystem decision-making. |
| spellingShingle | Anna E. van 't Veer Mariëlle Stel Ilja van Beest Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest Judgment and Decision Making deception cognitive processing capacity morality dualsystem decision-making. |
| title | Limited capacity to
lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest |
| title_full | Limited capacity to
lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest |
| title_fullStr | Limited capacity to
lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest |
| title_full_unstemmed | Limited capacity to
lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest |
| title_short | Limited capacity to
lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest |
| title_sort | limited capacity to lie cognitive load interferes with being dishonest |
| topic | deception cognitive processing capacity morality dualsystem decision-making. |
| url | http://journal.sjdm.org/13/131120/jdm131120.pdf |
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