Analyzing Supply Reliability Incentive in Pricing Regulation of Electricity Distribution Operators

In support of the global green transition, numerous policies have been introduced to efficiently address the increasing demand for reliable electricity. However, the impacts of these policies have received limited attention, despite the potential for unsuccessful policy targets to introduce ineffici...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Joel Seppälä, Pertti Järventausta
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2024-03-01
Series:Energies
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/6/1451
_version_ 1797241273648676864
author Joel Seppälä
Pertti Järventausta
author_facet Joel Seppälä
Pertti Järventausta
author_sort Joel Seppälä
collection DOAJ
description In support of the global green transition, numerous policies have been introduced to efficiently address the increasing demand for reliable electricity. However, the impacts of these policies have received limited attention, despite the potential for unsuccessful policy targets to introduce inefficiencies into the energy system, subsequently diminishing societal wealth. This study bridges this research gap by conducting a comprehensive examination of a supply reliability incentive within electricity pricing regulation, aiming to contribute new insights for policy assessments. Analyzing data from all electricity distribution operators within a single jurisdiction, the study investigates the volume and distribution of economic steering to elucidate the overall societal impact. The findings suggest a rewarding system for positive developments in indices, regardless of the absolute interruption index levels, highlighting the importance of precise variable definitions in implementing incentive mechanisms. The assessment tools developed for this study will be valuable for further regulation and policy assessments.
first_indexed 2024-04-24T18:20:43Z
format Article
id doaj.art-ddc6f39d25ce49e882791f88cf079626
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 1996-1073
language English
last_indexed 2024-04-24T18:20:43Z
publishDate 2024-03-01
publisher MDPI AG
record_format Article
series Energies
spelling doaj.art-ddc6f39d25ce49e882791f88cf0796262024-03-27T13:35:47ZengMDPI AGEnergies1996-10732024-03-01176145110.3390/en17061451Analyzing Supply Reliability Incentive in Pricing Regulation of Electricity Distribution OperatorsJoel Seppälä0Pertti Järventausta1Unit of Electrical Engineering, Tampere University, Korkeakoulunkatu 7, FI-33720 Tampere, FinlandUnit of Electrical Engineering, Tampere University, Korkeakoulunkatu 7, FI-33720 Tampere, FinlandIn support of the global green transition, numerous policies have been introduced to efficiently address the increasing demand for reliable electricity. However, the impacts of these policies have received limited attention, despite the potential for unsuccessful policy targets to introduce inefficiencies into the energy system, subsequently diminishing societal wealth. This study bridges this research gap by conducting a comprehensive examination of a supply reliability incentive within electricity pricing regulation, aiming to contribute new insights for policy assessments. Analyzing data from all electricity distribution operators within a single jurisdiction, the study investigates the volume and distribution of economic steering to elucidate the overall societal impact. The findings suggest a rewarding system for positive developments in indices, regardless of the absolute interruption index levels, highlighting the importance of precise variable definitions in implementing incentive mechanisms. The assessment tools developed for this study will be valuable for further regulation and policy assessments.https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/6/1451electricity distributioneconomic regulationsecurity of supplyclustering
spellingShingle Joel Seppälä
Pertti Järventausta
Analyzing Supply Reliability Incentive in Pricing Regulation of Electricity Distribution Operators
Energies
electricity distribution
economic regulation
security of supply
clustering
title Analyzing Supply Reliability Incentive in Pricing Regulation of Electricity Distribution Operators
title_full Analyzing Supply Reliability Incentive in Pricing Regulation of Electricity Distribution Operators
title_fullStr Analyzing Supply Reliability Incentive in Pricing Regulation of Electricity Distribution Operators
title_full_unstemmed Analyzing Supply Reliability Incentive in Pricing Regulation of Electricity Distribution Operators
title_short Analyzing Supply Reliability Incentive in Pricing Regulation of Electricity Distribution Operators
title_sort analyzing supply reliability incentive in pricing regulation of electricity distribution operators
topic electricity distribution
economic regulation
security of supply
clustering
url https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/6/1451
work_keys_str_mv AT joelseppala analyzingsupplyreliabilityincentiveinpricingregulationofelectricitydistributionoperators
AT perttijarventausta analyzingsupplyreliabilityincentiveinpricingregulationofelectricitydistributionoperators