Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in Uganda
Citizen monitoring of government performance is often ineffective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rests. In a field experiment, we test whether deliveri...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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SAGE Publishing
2020-08-01
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| Series: | Research & Politics |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020934350 |
| _version_ | 1818212395097522176 |
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| author | Mark T. Buntaine Brigham Daniels |
| author_facet | Mark T. Buntaine Brigham Daniels |
| author_sort | Mark T. Buntaine |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Citizen monitoring of government performance is often ineffective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rests. In a field experiment, we test whether delivering regular, officially certified reports derived from citizen monitoring and describing specific problems with the implementation of public projects to high-level bureaucrats charged with overseeing the projects improved their delivery. We do not find evidence that this treatment improved the delivery of public projects. Follow-up interviews revealed that the targeted officials seemed to avoid knowledge of the monitoring, perhaps to avoid taking on the responsibility that would come from such knowledge. However, the treatment also provided information to citizens about what they should expect from local governments, which instigated several direct complaints that the targeted officials did not ignore. Based on this alternative channel, which we did not anticipate, we conclude that citizen monitoring must be deployed in ways that make knowledge of problems undeniable for authorities who have a responsibility to address them. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-12T05:47:42Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-de28d3e8e4814b8f839065ea158ad494 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2053-1680 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-12T05:47:42Z |
| publishDate | 2020-08-01 |
| publisher | SAGE Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Research & Politics |
| spelling | doaj.art-de28d3e8e4814b8f839065ea158ad4942022-12-22T00:35:45ZengSAGE PublishingResearch & Politics2053-16802020-08-01710.1177/2053168020934350Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in UgandaMark T. Buntaine0Brigham Daniels1University of California, Santa Barbara, USABrigham Young University, USACitizen monitoring of government performance is often ineffective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rests. In a field experiment, we test whether delivering regular, officially certified reports derived from citizen monitoring and describing specific problems with the implementation of public projects to high-level bureaucrats charged with overseeing the projects improved their delivery. We do not find evidence that this treatment improved the delivery of public projects. Follow-up interviews revealed that the targeted officials seemed to avoid knowledge of the monitoring, perhaps to avoid taking on the responsibility that would come from such knowledge. However, the treatment also provided information to citizens about what they should expect from local governments, which instigated several direct complaints that the targeted officials did not ignore. Based on this alternative channel, which we did not anticipate, we conclude that citizen monitoring must be deployed in ways that make knowledge of problems undeniable for authorities who have a responsibility to address them.https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020934350 |
| spellingShingle | Mark T. Buntaine Brigham Daniels Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in Uganda Research & Politics |
| title | Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in Uganda |
| title_full | Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in Uganda |
| title_fullStr | Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in Uganda |
| title_full_unstemmed | Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in Uganda |
| title_short | Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in Uganda |
| title_sort | combining bottom up monitoring and top down accountability a field experiment on managing corruption in uganda |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020934350 |
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