No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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The NKUA Applied Philosophy Research Laboratory
2021-09-01
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| Series: | Conatus - Journal of Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/Conatus/article/view/24930 |
| Summary: | Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical realism. Secondly, I will argue that metaphysical realists must commit to metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to solve Putnam’s problem. Thirdly, I will argue that metaphysical anthropocentrism requires monotheism. Lastly, I argue that metaphysical realism is true. Therefore, we must be ontologically committed to God.
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| ISSN: | 2653-9373 2459-3842 |