No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism

Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical...

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Main Author: Åke Gafvelin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: The NKUA Applied Philosophy Research Laboratory 2021-09-01
Series:Conatus - Journal of Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/Conatus/article/view/24930
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author Åke Gafvelin
author_facet Åke Gafvelin
author_sort Åke Gafvelin
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description Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical realism. Secondly, I will argue that metaphysical realists must commit to metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to solve Putnam’s problem. Thirdly, I will argue that metaphysical anthropocentrism requires monotheism. Lastly, I argue that metaphysical realism is true. Therefore, we must be ontologically committed to God. 
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spelling doaj.art-de6aa388357f46459c4fbaf25bafc6732022-12-22T02:22:23ZengThe NKUA Applied Philosophy Research LaboratoryConatus - Journal of Philosophy2653-93732459-38422021-09-016110.12681/cjp.24930No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for MonotheismÅke Gafvelin0University of CambridgeMetaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical realism. Secondly, I will argue that metaphysical realists must commit to metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to solve Putnam’s problem. Thirdly, I will argue that metaphysical anthropocentrism requires monotheism. Lastly, I argue that metaphysical realism is true. Therefore, we must be ontologically committed to God.  https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/Conatus/article/view/24930philosophy of languagephilosophy of religionKripkensteinQuinePutnamPlantinga
spellingShingle Åke Gafvelin
No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
Conatus - Journal of Philosophy
philosophy of language
philosophy of religion
Kripkenstein
Quine
Putnam
Plantinga
title No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
title_full No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
title_fullStr No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
title_full_unstemmed No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
title_short No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
title_sort no god no god s eye a quasi putnamian argument for monotheism
topic philosophy of language
philosophy of religion
Kripkenstein
Quine
Putnam
Plantinga
url https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/Conatus/article/view/24930
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