No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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The NKUA Applied Philosophy Research Laboratory
2021-09-01
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Series: | Conatus - Journal of Philosophy |
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Online Access: | https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/Conatus/article/view/24930 |
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author | Åke Gafvelin |
author_facet | Åke Gafvelin |
author_sort | Åke Gafvelin |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical realism. Secondly, I will argue that metaphysical realists must commit to metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to solve Putnam’s problem. Thirdly, I will argue that metaphysical anthropocentrism requires monotheism. Lastly, I argue that metaphysical realism is true. Therefore, we must be ontologically committed to God.
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first_indexed | 2024-04-14T00:36:19Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-de6aa388357f46459c4fbaf25bafc673 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2653-9373 2459-3842 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-14T00:36:19Z |
publishDate | 2021-09-01 |
publisher | The NKUA Applied Philosophy Research Laboratory |
record_format | Article |
series | Conatus - Journal of Philosophy |
spelling | doaj.art-de6aa388357f46459c4fbaf25bafc6732022-12-22T02:22:23ZengThe NKUA Applied Philosophy Research LaboratoryConatus - Journal of Philosophy2653-93732459-38422021-09-016110.12681/cjp.24930No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for MonotheismÅke Gafvelin0University of CambridgeMetaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical realism. Secondly, I will argue that metaphysical realists must commit to metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to solve Putnam’s problem. Thirdly, I will argue that metaphysical anthropocentrism requires monotheism. Lastly, I argue that metaphysical realism is true. Therefore, we must be ontologically committed to God. https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/Conatus/article/view/24930philosophy of languagephilosophy of religionKripkensteinQuinePutnamPlantinga |
spellingShingle | Åke Gafvelin No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism Conatus - Journal of Philosophy philosophy of language philosophy of religion Kripkenstein Quine Putnam Plantinga |
title | No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism |
title_full | No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism |
title_fullStr | No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism |
title_full_unstemmed | No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism |
title_short | No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism |
title_sort | no god no god s eye a quasi putnamian argument for monotheism |
topic | philosophy of language philosophy of religion Kripkenstein Quine Putnam Plantinga |
url | https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/Conatus/article/view/24930 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT akegafvelin nogodnogodseyeaquasiputnamianargumentformonotheism |