A pluralistic moral mind

In this paper I offer some criticisms of Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. In Dancy’s version moral particularism states that there are neither general nor universal moral principles, that moral action is not the application of principles to particular cases, that moral reasoning has no motivati...

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Main Author: Pierpaolo Marrone
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Mimesis Edizioni, Milano 2021-08-01
Series:Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0010
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author Pierpaolo Marrone
author_facet Pierpaolo Marrone
author_sort Pierpaolo Marrone
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description In this paper I offer some criticisms of Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. In Dancy’s version moral particularism states that there are neither general nor universal moral principles, that moral action is not the application of principles to particular cases, that moral reasoning has no motivational force because it deduces what must be done by moral principles, and that the agent who acts morally is not a person who has moral principles. However, Dancy’s proposal fails to explain the regularity of moral behavior and the function of stability that moral agents and moral psychology play within social cooperation, nor is it able to explain the possibility of moral progress.
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spelling doaj.art-defc86c8bcce4891aae9ca20dd86fcaf2022-12-21T21:46:06ZdeuMimesis Edizioni, MilanoRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia2039-46672239-26292021-08-0112211012410.4453/rifp.2021.0010A pluralistic moral mindPierpaolo MarroneIn this paper I offer some criticisms of Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. In Dancy’s version moral particularism states that there are neither general nor universal moral principles, that moral action is not the application of principles to particular cases, that moral reasoning has no motivational force because it deduces what must be done by moral principles, and that the agent who acts morally is not a person who has moral principles. However, Dancy’s proposal fails to explain the regularity of moral behavior and the function of stability that moral agents and moral psychology play within social cooperation, nor is it able to explain the possibility of moral progress.https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0010jonathan dancymoral psychologyprinciplescooperation
spellingShingle Pierpaolo Marrone
A pluralistic moral mind
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
jonathan dancy
moral psychology
principles
cooperation
title A pluralistic moral mind
title_full A pluralistic moral mind
title_fullStr A pluralistic moral mind
title_full_unstemmed A pluralistic moral mind
title_short A pluralistic moral mind
title_sort pluralistic moral mind
topic jonathan dancy
moral psychology
principles
cooperation
url https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0010
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