A pluralistic moral mind
In this paper I offer some criticisms of Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. In Dancy’s version moral particularism states that there are neither general nor universal moral principles, that moral action is not the application of principles to particular cases, that moral reasoning has no motivati...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
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Mimesis Edizioni, Milano
2021-08-01
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Series: | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
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Online Access: | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0010 |
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author | Pierpaolo Marrone |
author_facet | Pierpaolo Marrone |
author_sort | Pierpaolo Marrone |
collection | DOAJ |
description | In this paper I offer some criticisms of Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. In Dancy’s version moral particularism states that there are neither general nor universal moral principles, that moral action is not the application of principles to particular cases, that moral reasoning has no motivational force because it deduces what must be done by moral principles, and that the agent who acts morally is not a person who has moral principles. However, Dancy’s proposal fails to explain the regularity of moral behavior and the function of stability that moral agents and moral psychology play within social cooperation, nor is it able to explain the possibility of moral progress. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-17T13:49:01Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-defc86c8bcce4891aae9ca20dd86fcaf |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2039-4667 2239-2629 |
language | deu |
last_indexed | 2024-12-17T13:49:01Z |
publishDate | 2021-08-01 |
publisher | Mimesis Edizioni, Milano |
record_format | Article |
series | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
spelling | doaj.art-defc86c8bcce4891aae9ca20dd86fcaf2022-12-21T21:46:06ZdeuMimesis Edizioni, MilanoRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia2039-46672239-26292021-08-0112211012410.4453/rifp.2021.0010A pluralistic moral mindPierpaolo MarroneIn this paper I offer some criticisms of Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. In Dancy’s version moral particularism states that there are neither general nor universal moral principles, that moral action is not the application of principles to particular cases, that moral reasoning has no motivational force because it deduces what must be done by moral principles, and that the agent who acts morally is not a person who has moral principles. However, Dancy’s proposal fails to explain the regularity of moral behavior and the function of stability that moral agents and moral psychology play within social cooperation, nor is it able to explain the possibility of moral progress.https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0010jonathan dancymoral psychologyprinciplescooperation |
spellingShingle | Pierpaolo Marrone A pluralistic moral mind Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia jonathan dancy moral psychology principles cooperation |
title | A pluralistic moral mind |
title_full | A pluralistic moral mind |
title_fullStr | A pluralistic moral mind |
title_full_unstemmed | A pluralistic moral mind |
title_short | A pluralistic moral mind |
title_sort | pluralistic moral mind |
topic | jonathan dancy moral psychology principles cooperation |
url | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0010 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT pierpaolomarrone apluralisticmoralmind AT pierpaolomarrone pluralisticmoralmind |