Arguments de choix rationnel et contractualisme : les cas symétriques de Rousseau et de Pareto
This article holds an inquiry into Vilfredo Pareto’s profile as a rational-choice theorist who abstains from drawing conclusions from rational-choice analysis in the field of contractarian theory. The symmetrical case of Jean-Jacques Rousseau is also examined: the case of a theorist who, although he...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Association Œconomia
2011-03-01
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| Series: | Œconomia |
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| Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/oeconomia/1745 |
| Summary: | This article holds an inquiry into Vilfredo Pareto’s profile as a rational-choice theorist who abstains from drawing conclusions from rational-choice analysis in the field of contractarian theory. The symmetrical case of Jean-Jacques Rousseau is also examined: the case of a theorist who, although he has been described (notably by David Gauthier) as a contractarian theorist who rejects the typical hypotheses we now associate with rational-choice analysis, turns out to make use of a wide array of arguments which remind us of rational-choice and even cost-efficiency analyses. It is argued that this is crucially related to contractarian argument in Rousseau’s work. |
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| ISSN: | 2113-5207 2269-8450 |