DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes
The paper presents a novel technique to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks applied by misbehaving nodes in wireless networks with the presence of hidden nodes employing the widely used IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) protocols described in the IEEE standard [1]. Attacker node...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2014-07-01
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| Series: | Journal of Advanced Research |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2090123213001379 |
| _version_ | 1818832997172903936 |
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| author | Joseph Soryal Xijie Liu Tarek Saadawi |
| author_facet | Joseph Soryal Xijie Liu Tarek Saadawi |
| author_sort | Joseph Soryal |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The paper presents a novel technique to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks applied by misbehaving nodes in wireless networks with the presence of hidden nodes employing the widely used IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) protocols described in the IEEE standard [1]. Attacker nodes alter the IEEE 802.11 DCF firmware to illicitly capture the channel via elevating the probability of the average number of packets transmitted successfully using up the bandwidth share of the innocent nodes that follow the protocol standards. We obtained the theoretical network throughput by solving two-dimensional Markov Chain model as described by Bianchi [2], and Liu and Saadawi [3] to determine the channel capacity. We validated the results obtained via the theoretical computations with the results obtained by OPNET simulator [4] to define the baseline for the average attainable throughput in the channel under standard conditions where all nodes follow the standards. The main goal of the DoS attacker is to prevent the innocent nodes from accessing the channel and by capturing the channel’s bandwidth. In addition, the attacker strives to appear as an innocent node that follows the standards. The protocol resides in every node to enable each node to police other nodes in its immediate wireless coverage area. All innocent nodes are able to detect and identify the DoS attacker in its wireless coverage area. We applied the protocol to two Physical Layer technologies: Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and the results are presented to validate the algorithm. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-19T02:11:55Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-e09bdf3f0b334cd8b0aed25153b81087 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2090-1232 2090-1224 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-19T02:11:55Z |
| publishDate | 2014-07-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Advanced Research |
| spelling | doaj.art-e09bdf3f0b334cd8b0aed25153b810872022-12-21T20:40:42ZengElsevierJournal of Advanced Research2090-12322090-12242014-07-015441542210.1016/j.jare.2013.11.001DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodesJoseph SoryalXijie LiuTarek SaadawiThe paper presents a novel technique to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks applied by misbehaving nodes in wireless networks with the presence of hidden nodes employing the widely used IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) protocols described in the IEEE standard [1]. Attacker nodes alter the IEEE 802.11 DCF firmware to illicitly capture the channel via elevating the probability of the average number of packets transmitted successfully using up the bandwidth share of the innocent nodes that follow the protocol standards. We obtained the theoretical network throughput by solving two-dimensional Markov Chain model as described by Bianchi [2], and Liu and Saadawi [3] to determine the channel capacity. We validated the results obtained via the theoretical computations with the results obtained by OPNET simulator [4] to define the baseline for the average attainable throughput in the channel under standard conditions where all nodes follow the standards. The main goal of the DoS attacker is to prevent the innocent nodes from accessing the channel and by capturing the channel’s bandwidth. In addition, the attacker strives to appear as an innocent node that follows the standards. The protocol resides in every node to enable each node to police other nodes in its immediate wireless coverage area. All innocent nodes are able to detect and identify the DoS attacker in its wireless coverage area. We applied the protocol to two Physical Layer technologies: Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and the results are presented to validate the algorithm.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2090123213001379Network securityWireless networksIEEE 802.11Markov ChainNetwork mapping |
| spellingShingle | Joseph Soryal Xijie Liu Tarek Saadawi DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes Journal of Advanced Research Network security Wireless networks IEEE 802.11 Markov Chain Network mapping |
| title | DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes |
| title_full | DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes |
| title_fullStr | DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes |
| title_full_unstemmed | DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes |
| title_short | DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes |
| title_sort | dos detection in ieee 802 11 with the presence of hidden nodes |
| topic | Network security Wireless networks IEEE 802.11 Markov Chain Network mapping |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2090123213001379 |
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