Clean energy-based rural low carbon transformation considering the supply and demand of new energy under government participation: A three-participators game model
Since the 20th century, human society has developed rapidly, and with the continuous development of urbanization, serious environmental pollution problems have followed. Actively studying the development of new energy industry has become an important issue around the world. Rural energy is an import...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2022-11-01
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| Series: | Energy Reports |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484722017619 |
| _version_ | 1828011047661862912 |
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| author | Yuanyuan Yu Shi Yin Aijun Zhang |
| author_facet | Yuanyuan Yu Shi Yin Aijun Zhang |
| author_sort | Yuanyuan Yu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Since the 20th century, human society has developed rapidly, and with the continuous development of urbanization, serious environmental pollution problems have followed. Actively studying the development of new energy industry has become an important issue around the world. Rural energy is an important foundation of rural economic and development. Promoting green energy transformation and development in rural areas is an inherent requirement to meet people’s needs for a better life and an important part of building a modern energy system. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, new energy enterprises and farmers, and analyzes the evolutionary path and stable strategy of the three participants in the process of energy industry transformation. The results show that (1) moderate or high level of government subsidies for farmers use of new energy can promote the development of new energy industry, while low level of subsidies is not conducive to the development of rural new energy industry. (2) When the government’s investment in new energy infrastructure construction is low, farmers will choose to use new energy passively. When the government’s investment in new energy infrastructure construction is moderate or high, farmers will choose to actively use new energy, and new energy enterprises will evolve to actively produce new energy under the circumstance of active use by farmers. (3) Under the current development situation of rural new energy industry, the smaller the proportion coefficient of pollution control costs borne by new energy enterprises formulated by the government, the more conducive the evolution of new energy enterprises to actively produce new energy. Perfect farmers use of new energy countermeasures for the benign development of new energy industry is of great significance. Therefore, from the perspective of evolutionary game, we should promote the transformation of environmental governance to public governance mode. A basic framework for a tripartite coordination mechanism among farmers, the government and enterprises will be established. At the same time, the establishment of specific systems and policies will guide the interests of farmers, the government and new energy enterprises, so as to truly realize the positive development of the new energy industry driven by the participation of three parties. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-10T09:09:19Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-e0e02826fd1c4baea6b31f3d1ffe9dfe |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2352-4847 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-10T09:09:19Z |
| publishDate | 2022-11-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Energy Reports |
| spelling | doaj.art-e0e02826fd1c4baea6b31f3d1ffe9dfe2023-02-21T05:13:26ZengElsevierEnergy Reports2352-48472022-11-0181201112025Clean energy-based rural low carbon transformation considering the supply and demand of new energy under government participation: A three-participators game modelYuanyuan Yu0Shi Yin1Aijun Zhang2College of Economics and Management, Hebei Agricultural University, Baoding 071001, ChinaCollege of Economics and Management, Hebei Agricultural University, Baoding 071001, China; School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin, 150001, China; National North Mountain Agricultural Engineering Technology Research Center, Hebei Agricultural University, Baoding 071001, China; Corresponding author at: National North Mountain Agricultural Engineering Technology Research Center, Hebei Agricultural University, Baoding 071001, China.National North Mountain Agricultural Engineering Technology Research Center, Hebei Agricultural University, Baoding 071001, China; Corresponding author at: National North Mountain Agricultural Engineering Technology Research Center, Hebei Agricultural University, Baoding 071001, China.Since the 20th century, human society has developed rapidly, and with the continuous development of urbanization, serious environmental pollution problems have followed. Actively studying the development of new energy industry has become an important issue around the world. Rural energy is an important foundation of rural economic and development. Promoting green energy transformation and development in rural areas is an inherent requirement to meet people’s needs for a better life and an important part of building a modern energy system. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, new energy enterprises and farmers, and analyzes the evolutionary path and stable strategy of the three participants in the process of energy industry transformation. The results show that (1) moderate or high level of government subsidies for farmers use of new energy can promote the development of new energy industry, while low level of subsidies is not conducive to the development of rural new energy industry. (2) When the government’s investment in new energy infrastructure construction is low, farmers will choose to use new energy passively. When the government’s investment in new energy infrastructure construction is moderate or high, farmers will choose to actively use new energy, and new energy enterprises will evolve to actively produce new energy under the circumstance of active use by farmers. (3) Under the current development situation of rural new energy industry, the smaller the proportion coefficient of pollution control costs borne by new energy enterprises formulated by the government, the more conducive the evolution of new energy enterprises to actively produce new energy. Perfect farmers use of new energy countermeasures for the benign development of new energy industry is of great significance. Therefore, from the perspective of evolutionary game, we should promote the transformation of environmental governance to public governance mode. A basic framework for a tripartite coordination mechanism among farmers, the government and enterprises will be established. At the same time, the establishment of specific systems and policies will guide the interests of farmers, the government and new energy enterprises, so as to truly realize the positive development of the new energy industry driven by the participation of three parties.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484722017619Government supervisionRural new energyEvolutionary game theory |
| spellingShingle | Yuanyuan Yu Shi Yin Aijun Zhang Clean energy-based rural low carbon transformation considering the supply and demand of new energy under government participation: A three-participators game model Energy Reports Government supervision Rural new energy Evolutionary game theory |
| title | Clean energy-based rural low carbon transformation considering the supply and demand of new energy under government participation: A three-participators game model |
| title_full | Clean energy-based rural low carbon transformation considering the supply and demand of new energy under government participation: A three-participators game model |
| title_fullStr | Clean energy-based rural low carbon transformation considering the supply and demand of new energy under government participation: A three-participators game model |
| title_full_unstemmed | Clean energy-based rural low carbon transformation considering the supply and demand of new energy under government participation: A three-participators game model |
| title_short | Clean energy-based rural low carbon transformation considering the supply and demand of new energy under government participation: A three-participators game model |
| title_sort | clean energy based rural low carbon transformation considering the supply and demand of new energy under government participation a three participators game model |
| topic | Government supervision Rural new energy Evolutionary game theory |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484722017619 |
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