Device-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions
In device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD), an adversary prepares a device consisting of two components, distributed to Alice and Bob, who use the device to generate a secure key. The security of existing DIQKD schemes holds under the assumption that the two components of the device cann...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2021-01-01
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| Series: | New Journal of Physics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ac304b |
| _version_ | 1797750031862726656 |
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| author | Tony Metger Yfke Dulek Andrea Coladangelo Rotem Arnon-Friedman |
| author_facet | Tony Metger Yfke Dulek Andrea Coladangelo Rotem Arnon-Friedman |
| author_sort | Tony Metger |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD), an adversary prepares a device consisting of two components, distributed to Alice and Bob, who use the device to generate a secure key. The security of existing DIQKD schemes holds under the assumption that the two components of the device cannot communicate with one another during the protocol execution. This is called the no-communication assumption in DIQKD. Here, we show how to replace this assumption, which can be hard to enforce in practice, by a standard computational assumption from post-quantum cryptography: we give a protocol that produces secure keys even when the components of an adversarial device can exchange arbitrary quantum communication, assuming the device is computationally bounded. Importantly, the computational assumption only needs to hold during the protocol execution—the keys generated at the end of the protocol are information-theoretically secure as in standard DIQKD protocols. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:27:56Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-e0f4642662024d9f81a5878553ecbcb3 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1367-2630 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:27:56Z |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | IOP Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | New Journal of Physics |
| spelling | doaj.art-e0f4642662024d9f81a5878553ecbcb32023-08-08T15:40:44ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302021-01-01231212302110.1088/1367-2630/ac304bDevice-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptionsTony Metger0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3108-8100Yfke Dulek1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9238-8174Andrea Coladangelo2https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6773-2711Rotem Arnon-Friedman3https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5808-6279Institute for Theoretical Physics , ETH Zurich, 8092 Zurich, SwitzerlandQuSoft, Centrum Wiskunde en Informatica, The NetherlandsEECS Department, University of California Berkeley , and Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, Berkeley, United States of AmericaDepartment of Physics of Complex Systems, Weizmann Institute of Science , IsraelIn device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD), an adversary prepares a device consisting of two components, distributed to Alice and Bob, who use the device to generate a secure key. The security of existing DIQKD schemes holds under the assumption that the two components of the device cannot communicate with one another during the protocol execution. This is called the no-communication assumption in DIQKD. Here, we show how to replace this assumption, which can be hard to enforce in practice, by a standard computational assumption from post-quantum cryptography: we give a protocol that produces secure keys even when the components of an adversarial device can exchange arbitrary quantum communication, assuming the device is computationally bounded. Importantly, the computational assumption only needs to hold during the protocol execution—the keys generated at the end of the protocol are information-theoretically secure as in standard DIQKD protocols.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ac304bquantum cryptographydevice-independencepost-quantum cryptography |
| spellingShingle | Tony Metger Yfke Dulek Andrea Coladangelo Rotem Arnon-Friedman Device-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions New Journal of Physics quantum cryptography device-independence post-quantum cryptography |
| title | Device-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions |
| title_full | Device-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions |
| title_fullStr | Device-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Device-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions |
| title_short | Device-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions |
| title_sort | device independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions |
| topic | quantum cryptography device-independence post-quantum cryptography |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ac304b |
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