Les frontières entre la logique et les mathématiques : le point de vue de Gilles-Gaston Granger
According to Gilles-Gaston Granger, the difference between logic and mathematics is a difference of degree. From propositional logic to mathematics through predicate and other logical calculations, the form loses in purity and the content increases gradually in thickness. From zero-degree of opposit...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Éditions Kimé
2016-05-01
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| Series: | Philosophia Scientiæ |
| Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/1191 |
| Summary: | According to Gilles-Gaston Granger, the difference between logic and mathematics is a difference of degree. From propositional logic to mathematics through predicate and other logical calculations, the form loses in purity and the content increases gradually in thickness. From zero-degree of opposition of a form to a content at the level of propositional logic to the logical-mathematics forms producing “formal content”, the calculation is enriched with individuation properties to the detriment of its metalogical properties. By saying so, Granger does not claim to have found a true criterion of logicity. The fact remains that he takes a number of presuppositions explicitly established as a cornerstone to demarcate the logic of mathematics. By considering these presuppositions, we want our aim was to show, as Pascal Engel previously recognized previously bynoted Pascal Engel, that they are not free of ambiguity both in their philosophical ramifications and in the technical difficulties they create. However, and unlike Engel, we will not go as far as to say that the Grangerian Conception, despite its ambiguities, is a criterion of logicity. |
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| ISSN: | 1281-2463 1775-4283 |