Evolving cooperation in multichannel games
Most evolutionary game theory focuses on isolated games. Here, Donahue et al. present a general framework for ‘multichannel games’ in which individuals engage in a set of parallel games with a partner, and show that such parallel interactions favor the evolution of reciprocity across games.
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Nature Portfolio
2020-08-01
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| Series: | Nature Communications |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17730-3 |
| _version_ | 1819198650556874752 |
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| author | Kate Donahue Oliver P. Hauser Martin A. Nowak Christian Hilbe |
| author_facet | Kate Donahue Oliver P. Hauser Martin A. Nowak Christian Hilbe |
| author_sort | Kate Donahue |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Most evolutionary game theory focuses on isolated games. Here, Donahue et al. present a general framework for ‘multichannel games’ in which individuals engage in a set of parallel games with a partner, and show that such parallel interactions favor the evolution of reciprocity across games. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-23T03:03:49Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-e50b86e746fb46ccaed8e2aa73b7824f |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2041-1723 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-23T03:03:49Z |
| publishDate | 2020-08-01 |
| publisher | Nature Portfolio |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Nature Communications |
| spelling | doaj.art-e50b86e746fb46ccaed8e2aa73b7824f2022-12-21T18:02:21ZengNature PortfolioNature Communications2041-17232020-08-011111910.1038/s41467-020-17730-3Evolving cooperation in multichannel gamesKate Donahue0Oliver P. Hauser1Martin A. Nowak2Christian Hilbe3Department of Computer Science, Cornell UniversityDepartment of Economics, University of ExeterDepartment of Mathematics, Harvard UniversityMax Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary BiologyMost evolutionary game theory focuses on isolated games. Here, Donahue et al. present a general framework for ‘multichannel games’ in which individuals engage in a set of parallel games with a partner, and show that such parallel interactions favor the evolution of reciprocity across games.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17730-3 |
| spellingShingle | Kate Donahue Oliver P. Hauser Martin A. Nowak Christian Hilbe Evolving cooperation in multichannel games Nature Communications |
| title | Evolving cooperation in multichannel games |
| title_full | Evolving cooperation in multichannel games |
| title_fullStr | Evolving cooperation in multichannel games |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolving cooperation in multichannel games |
| title_short | Evolving cooperation in multichannel games |
| title_sort | evolving cooperation in multichannel games |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17730-3 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT katedonahue evolvingcooperationinmultichannelgames AT oliverphauser evolvingcooperationinmultichannelgames AT martinanowak evolvingcooperationinmultichannelgames AT christianhilbe evolvingcooperationinmultichannelgames |