Research on Optimization of Public Opinion Supervision Model of Social Network Platform Based on Evolutionary Game

Network environments have recently emerged as a considerable research area. In addition to government supervision, platform supervision is also critical to improve network environments. So, we should improve the social network platform’s single regulatory model. Against this background, we described...

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Main Authors: Chunhua Jin, Xiaoxiao Zhai, Yanhong Ma
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2023-03-01
Series:Information
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/14/3/151
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author Chunhua Jin
Xiaoxiao Zhai
Yanhong Ma
author_facet Chunhua Jin
Xiaoxiao Zhai
Yanhong Ma
author_sort Chunhua Jin
collection DOAJ
description Network environments have recently emerged as a considerable research area. In addition to government supervision, platform supervision is also critical to improve network environments. So, we should improve the social network platform’s single regulatory model. Against this background, we described public opinion supervision as a game between marketing accounts, netizens, and the platform. Unlike previous studies, we considered the influence of marketing accounts on online public opinion. Because of the players’ bounded rationality, we built an evolutionary game model, and by solving it, we obtained the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Then, we analyzed the influence of relevant parameters on the evolutionary stable state. Our research results show that if the authenticity of the information is not high, to not publish is the best choice for the marketing account, and to not participate is the best choice for the netizen. The platform penalty for the marketing account is also directly related to the marketing account’s decision making. The platform penalty for the government, as well as the increase in the penalty risk coefficient, considerably affected the choice of platform. Finally, we put forward the “pre-event–in-the-event–post-event” three-stage supervision model, which provides countermeasures and suggestions for all parties to jointly maintain the network environment.
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spelling doaj.art-e63c8a25855c48149ea98af51a44a3182023-11-17T11:43:49ZengMDPI AGInformation2078-24892023-03-0114315110.3390/info14030151Research on Optimization of Public Opinion Supervision Model of Social Network Platform Based on Evolutionary GameChunhua Jin0Xiaoxiao Zhai1Yanhong Ma2School of Economics and Management, Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100192, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100192, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100192, ChinaNetwork environments have recently emerged as a considerable research area. In addition to government supervision, platform supervision is also critical to improve network environments. So, we should improve the social network platform’s single regulatory model. Against this background, we described public opinion supervision as a game between marketing accounts, netizens, and the platform. Unlike previous studies, we considered the influence of marketing accounts on online public opinion. Because of the players’ bounded rationality, we built an evolutionary game model, and by solving it, we obtained the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Then, we analyzed the influence of relevant parameters on the evolutionary stable state. Our research results show that if the authenticity of the information is not high, to not publish is the best choice for the marketing account, and to not participate is the best choice for the netizen. The platform penalty for the marketing account is also directly related to the marketing account’s decision making. The platform penalty for the government, as well as the increase in the penalty risk coefficient, considerably affected the choice of platform. Finally, we put forward the “pre-event–in-the-event–post-event” three-stage supervision model, which provides countermeasures and suggestions for all parties to jointly maintain the network environment.https://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/14/3/151social network platformnetwork marketingpublic opinion governanceevolutionary gameoptimization of supervision model
spellingShingle Chunhua Jin
Xiaoxiao Zhai
Yanhong Ma
Research on Optimization of Public Opinion Supervision Model of Social Network Platform Based on Evolutionary Game
Information
social network platform
network marketing
public opinion governance
evolutionary game
optimization of supervision model
title Research on Optimization of Public Opinion Supervision Model of Social Network Platform Based on Evolutionary Game
title_full Research on Optimization of Public Opinion Supervision Model of Social Network Platform Based on Evolutionary Game
title_fullStr Research on Optimization of Public Opinion Supervision Model of Social Network Platform Based on Evolutionary Game
title_full_unstemmed Research on Optimization of Public Opinion Supervision Model of Social Network Platform Based on Evolutionary Game
title_short Research on Optimization of Public Opinion Supervision Model of Social Network Platform Based on Evolutionary Game
title_sort research on optimization of public opinion supervision model of social network platform based on evolutionary game
topic social network platform
network marketing
public opinion governance
evolutionary game
optimization of supervision model
url https://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/14/3/151
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AT xiaoxiaozhai researchonoptimizationofpublicopinionsupervisionmodelofsocialnetworkplatformbasedonevolutionarygame
AT yanhongma researchonoptimizationofpublicopinionsupervisionmodelofsocialnetworkplatformbasedonevolutionarygame