Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason
This paper intends to set out an argument to Legal Idealism and a thesis that holds law and morality as <i>necessarily</i> connected. My focus is on deconstructing the Positivist argument to the Autonomy Thesis and beginning to reconstruct it through the application of morality to law&am...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2019-02-01
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| Series: | Laws |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/8/1/6 |
| _version_ | 1798006842367934464 |
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| author | Jack Clayton Thompson |
| author_facet | Jack Clayton Thompson |
| author_sort | Jack Clayton Thompson |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper intends to set out an argument to Legal Idealism and a thesis that holds law and morality as <i>necessarily</i> connected. My focus is on deconstructing the Positivist argument to the Autonomy Thesis and beginning to reconstruct it through the application of morality to law’s autonomous authority. My aim, ultimately, is to demonstrate how, through the <i>concept</i> of law, practical reason might explain the related (and overlapping) notions of legitimacy, authority, and the obligation to obey through the <i>necessary</i> connection of law and morality. That is, I intend to demonstrate that morality both survives and remains identifiable (transparently) following the process of metamorphosis into <i>institutionalised</i> practical reasoning. If this is so, the authority of and obligation to law is simultaneously a form of morally rational obligation. In the response to the Positivist argument that moral values are incommensurate, I will show that this commensurability can be determined ‘artificially’ by a system of institutionalised reasoning (i.e., the law); this is to say, if I can show that the Legal Positivist argument is left incomplete without some explanation of moral values underpinning it, I need not to show that a specific, defensible moral truth or principle is required, but that an artificial weighting of abstract moral principles is sufficient |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T13:02:09Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-e6bcd41aac384ce081c7c72ee906f535 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2075-471X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T13:02:09Z |
| publishDate | 2019-02-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Laws |
| spelling | doaj.art-e6bcd41aac384ce081c7c72ee906f5352022-12-22T04:22:55ZengMDPI AGLaws2075-471X2019-02-0181610.3390/laws8010006laws8010006Law’s Autonomy and Moral ReasonJack Clayton Thompson0Brighton Business School, University of Brighton, Mithras House, Lewes Road, Brighton BN2 4AT, UKThis paper intends to set out an argument to Legal Idealism and a thesis that holds law and morality as <i>necessarily</i> connected. My focus is on deconstructing the Positivist argument to the Autonomy Thesis and beginning to reconstruct it through the application of morality to law’s autonomous authority. My aim, ultimately, is to demonstrate how, through the <i>concept</i> of law, practical reason might explain the related (and overlapping) notions of legitimacy, authority, and the obligation to obey through the <i>necessary</i> connection of law and morality. That is, I intend to demonstrate that morality both survives and remains identifiable (transparently) following the process of metamorphosis into <i>institutionalised</i> practical reasoning. If this is so, the authority of and obligation to law is simultaneously a form of morally rational obligation. In the response to the Positivist argument that moral values are incommensurate, I will show that this commensurability can be determined ‘artificially’ by a system of institutionalised reasoning (i.e., the law); this is to say, if I can show that the Legal Positivist argument is left incomplete without some explanation of moral values underpinning it, I need not to show that a specific, defensible moral truth or principle is required, but that an artificial weighting of abstract moral principles is sufficienthttps://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/8/1/6PositivismNatural LawLegal TheoryLegal IdealismGewirthMoralityAuthority of Law |
| spellingShingle | Jack Clayton Thompson Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason Laws Positivism Natural Law Legal Theory Legal Idealism Gewirth Morality Authority of Law |
| title | Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason |
| title_full | Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason |
| title_fullStr | Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason |
| title_full_unstemmed | Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason |
| title_short | Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason |
| title_sort | law s autonomy and moral reason |
| topic | Positivism Natural Law Legal Theory Legal Idealism Gewirth Morality Authority of Law |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/8/1/6 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jackclaytonthompson lawsautonomyandmoralreason |