Segmentos econômicos e determinantes do financiamento político no Brasil
Objective/context: The objective of this article is to analyze the determinants of the electoral investment of the Brazilian Entrepreneurs elite, discussing the incentives generated from their respective economic sectors. The context is the 2014 election, chosen because it is the last campaign with...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidad de los Andes
2020-01-01
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| Series: | Colombia Internacional |
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| Online Access: | https://revistas.uniandes.edu.co/doi/full/10.7440/colombiaint101.2020.05 |
| Summary: | Objective/context: The objective of this article is to analyze the determinants of the electoral investment of the Brazilian Entrepreneurs elite, discussing the incentives generated from their respective economic sectors. The context is the 2014 election, chosen because it is the last campaign with corporate donations allowed by law. Methodology: Through a logistic regression model, I estimated the likelihood of a big corporation making donations in the 2014 election, considering its sectoral strength. In the model, I analyzed the determinants of financing, especially public resources granted to donors: federal government contracts and financial loans. The data were compiled from the electoral data repository of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), Federal Government Transparency Portal and National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). Conclusions: The results indicated that there is not a significant relevance of the direct advantages obtained by campaign donors from the public administration, but rather the structural economic factors —such as the predominant position of the company in its economic sector and a well established historical trajectory in Brazilian capitalism. Originality: The “Interested money” was most visible in certain segments, especially industry and civil construction. However, the entrepreneurs elite from all sectors (the largest donors) presented a similar funding pattern: contributions to national campaigns, presidential and party structures. While small donors, also from all segments, invested preferentially in individual candidates: Congressman and state deputies. The article aimed to reflect on the existence of a specific dynamic of retribution or prospecting for political favors that depends of the company’s economic size, in addition to its respective incentives and collective sectoral interests |
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| ISSN: | 0121-5612 1900-6004 |