Ontological constraints on rational irrationality: the case of electoral preferences
This paper is concerned with Caplan’s (2000, 2001, 2006) rational irrationality model and its application on electoral preference formation. According to this model, individuals consume irrationality in a rational manner i.e. they maximize their total welfare through an exchange between their materi...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
General Association of Economists from Romania
2014-11-01
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| Series: | Theoretical and Applied Economics |
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| Online Access: |
http://store.ectap.ro/articole/1038.pdf
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| Summary: | This paper is concerned with Caplan’s (2000, 2001, 2006) rational
irrationality model and its application on electoral preference formation.
According to this model, individuals consume irrationality in a rational manner i.e.
they maximize their total welfare through an exchange between their material and
psychological welfare. Using the contributions of an important debate from the
philosophy of economics regarding the imposition of ontological constraints on
models, unrealistic assumptions and explanatory unification, two arguments are
formulated: First, Caplan’s model is ontologically bewildered – it contains
opposed statements about the psychological descriptiveness of rational
irrationality. Second, even though Caplan is apparently aware of the tension
between ontological and tractability considerations he seems to privilege the latter. |
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| ISSN: | 1841-8678 1844-0029 |