Voting behavior and budget stability
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the implementation of the Budgetary Stability Law has affected Political Budget Cycles generated by Spanish local governments. Specifically, we study whether the evolution of debt, budget deficit, capital spending and current spending over the electoral cycle...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidad de Murcia
2019-03-01
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| Series: | Revista de Contabilidad: Spanish Accounting Review |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.um.es/rcsar/article/view/368161 |
| _version_ | 1818119202477703168 |
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| author | Cristina Vicente Cristina Vicente Ana María Rios Maria-Dolores Guillamón |
| author_facet | Cristina Vicente Cristina Vicente Ana María Rios Maria-Dolores Guillamón |
| author_sort | Cristina Vicente |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The aim of this paper is to analyze how the implementation of the Budgetary Stability Law has affected Political Budget Cycles generated by Spanish local governments. Specifically, we study whether the evolution of debt, budget deficit, capital spending and current spending over the electoral cycle has changed after the introduction of this law. We use a sample of 132 Spanish municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants (including the provincial capitals) during the period 1995–2009. Our results show that the Budgetary Stability Law has avoided electoral cycles in debt. On the contrary, the adoption of this law has not mitigated the incumbents’ incentives to manipulate deficit, capital spending and current spending with electoral aims. Nevertheless, it has caused a change in the way in which mayors manipulate fiscal policy over the electoral cycle. The opportunistic expansion covered both preelectoral year and the electoral year before the implementation of this fiscal rule, while after that, deficit and spending increases are confined in the election year. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-11T05:06:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ea1e7030d18147c1bd7dadd830572402 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1138-4891 1988-4672 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-11T05:06:27Z |
| publishDate | 2019-03-01 |
| publisher | Universidad de Murcia |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Revista de Contabilidad: Spanish Accounting Review |
| spelling | doaj.art-ea1e7030d18147c1bd7dadd8305724022022-12-22T01:20:01ZengUniversidad de MurciaRevista de Contabilidad: Spanish Accounting Review1138-48911988-46722019-03-0116110.1016/S1138-4891(13)70005-0Voting behavior and budget stabilityCristina VicenteCristina VicenteAna María RiosMaria-Dolores GuillamónThe aim of this paper is to analyze how the implementation of the Budgetary Stability Law has affected Political Budget Cycles generated by Spanish local governments. Specifically, we study whether the evolution of debt, budget deficit, capital spending and current spending over the electoral cycle has changed after the introduction of this law. We use a sample of 132 Spanish municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants (including the provincial capitals) during the period 1995–2009. Our results show that the Budgetary Stability Law has avoided electoral cycles in debt. On the contrary, the adoption of this law has not mitigated the incumbents’ incentives to manipulate deficit, capital spending and current spending with electoral aims. Nevertheless, it has caused a change in the way in which mayors manipulate fiscal policy over the electoral cycle. The opportunistic expansion covered both preelectoral year and the electoral year before the implementation of this fiscal rule, while after that, deficit and spending increases are confined in the election year.https://revistas.um.es/rcsar/article/view/368161Ley de Estabilidad PresupuestariaCiclos electoralesGobiernos locales |
| spellingShingle | Cristina Vicente Cristina Vicente Ana María Rios Maria-Dolores Guillamón Voting behavior and budget stability Revista de Contabilidad: Spanish Accounting Review Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria Ciclos electorales Gobiernos locales |
| title | Voting behavior and budget stability |
| title_full | Voting behavior and budget stability |
| title_fullStr | Voting behavior and budget stability |
| title_full_unstemmed | Voting behavior and budget stability |
| title_short | Voting behavior and budget stability |
| title_sort | voting behavior and budget stability |
| topic | Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria Ciclos electorales Gobiernos locales |
| url | https://revistas.um.es/rcsar/article/view/368161 |
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