Covering or monitoring? Independent director connectedness and corporate fraud in China
This paper examines how independent directors’ social capital, as measured by their social network, affects corporate fraud. We find that firms with well-connected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, supporting our monitoring effect hypothesis. This result is robust to a battery o...
Main Authors: | Jieli Xing, Yongjie Zhang, Xiong Xiong, Guangzhong Li |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier
2022-12-01
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Series: | China Journal of Accounting Research |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1755309122000533 |
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