Practical Security Bounds against Trojan Horse Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution
As the existence of non-zero reflection coefficients in the real component of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems, Eve can probe the system by sending the bright light pulses into Alice’s set-up. With the analysis of back-reflections, Eve only takes a few back-reflected pho...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2020-11-01
|
| Series: | Applied Sciences |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/21/7788 |
| _version_ | 1827702940656205824 |
|---|---|
| author | Yaxi Pan Ling Zhang Duan Huang |
| author_facet | Yaxi Pan Ling Zhang Duan Huang |
| author_sort | Yaxi Pan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | As the existence of non-zero reflection coefficients in the real component of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems, Eve can probe the system by sending the bright light pulses into Alice’s set-up. With the analysis of back-reflections, Eve only takes a few back-reflected photons to intercept information and obtain the raw key bit. In this paper, the attack problems are converted into the information leakage problems. First, we analyzed the Trojan horse attacks with different wavelengths and confirmed its side effects, such as crosstalk and anti-Stokes Raman scattering, by a numerical simulation. Then, based on the wavelength-dependent property of beam splitter, we presented a practical way to estimate the deviation of shot noise and therefore correct the excess noise by inserting different wavelength pulses under joint attacks. Finally, we specified the security bounds of the system through quantifying the excess noise bounds caused by the Trojan horse attacks and provided a theoretical reference for the secret key transmission of system. As a consequence, the transmission errors within the security bounds can be negligible and the legitimate users will not perceive the presence of Eve. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-10T15:07:33Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ea7f4cd6dc764008a942bbab41c4afa0 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2076-3417 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-10T15:07:33Z |
| publishDate | 2020-11-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Applied Sciences |
| spelling | doaj.art-ea7f4cd6dc764008a942bbab41c4afa02023-11-20T19:39:33ZengMDPI AGApplied Sciences2076-34172020-11-011021778810.3390/app10217788Practical Security Bounds against Trojan Horse Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key DistributionYaxi Pan0Ling Zhang1Duan Huang2School of Computer Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, ChinaSchool of Automation, Central South University, Changsha 410083, ChinaSchool of Computer Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, ChinaAs the existence of non-zero reflection coefficients in the real component of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems, Eve can probe the system by sending the bright light pulses into Alice’s set-up. With the analysis of back-reflections, Eve only takes a few back-reflected photons to intercept information and obtain the raw key bit. In this paper, the attack problems are converted into the information leakage problems. First, we analyzed the Trojan horse attacks with different wavelengths and confirmed its side effects, such as crosstalk and anti-Stokes Raman scattering, by a numerical simulation. Then, based on the wavelength-dependent property of beam splitter, we presented a practical way to estimate the deviation of shot noise and therefore correct the excess noise by inserting different wavelength pulses under joint attacks. Finally, we specified the security bounds of the system through quantifying the excess noise bounds caused by the Trojan horse attacks and provided a theoretical reference for the secret key transmission of system. As a consequence, the transmission errors within the security bounds can be negligible and the legitimate users will not perceive the presence of Eve.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/21/7788CV-QKDtrojan horse attackssecurity bounds |
| spellingShingle | Yaxi Pan Ling Zhang Duan Huang Practical Security Bounds against Trojan Horse Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Applied Sciences CV-QKD trojan horse attacks security bounds |
| title | Practical Security Bounds against Trojan Horse Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution |
| title_full | Practical Security Bounds against Trojan Horse Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution |
| title_fullStr | Practical Security Bounds against Trojan Horse Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution |
| title_full_unstemmed | Practical Security Bounds against Trojan Horse Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution |
| title_short | Practical Security Bounds against Trojan Horse Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution |
| title_sort | practical security bounds against trojan horse attacks in continuous variable quantum key distribution |
| topic | CV-QKD trojan horse attacks security bounds |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/21/7788 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yaxipan practicalsecurityboundsagainsttrojanhorseattacksincontinuousvariablequantumkeydistribution AT lingzhang practicalsecurityboundsagainsttrojanhorseattacksincontinuousvariablequantumkeydistribution AT duanhuang practicalsecurityboundsagainsttrojanhorseattacksincontinuousvariablequantumkeydistribution |