Mind-Dependent Kinds
Many philosophers take mind-independence to be criterial for realism about kinds. This is problematic when it comes to psychological and social kinds, which are unavoidably mind-dependent. But reflection on the case of artificial or synthetic kinds (e.g. synthetic chemicals, genetically modified or...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Vienna
2016-08-01
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| Series: | Journal of Social Ontology |
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| Online Access: | https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6834 |
| _version_ | 1797818243978625024 |
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| author | Muhammad Ali Khalidi |
| author_facet | Muhammad Ali Khalidi |
| author_sort | Muhammad Ali Khalidi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description |
Many philosophers take mind-independence to be criterial for realism about kinds. This is problematic when it comes to psychological and social kinds, which are unavoidably mind-dependent. But reflection on the case of artificial or synthetic kinds (e.g. synthetic chemicals, genetically modified organisms) shows that the criterion of mind-independence needs to be qualified in certain ways. However, I argue that none of the usual variants on the criterion of mind-dependence is capable of distinguishing real or natural kinds from non-real kinds. Although there is a way of modifying the criterion of mind-independence in such a way as to rule in artificial kinds but rule out psychological and social kinds, this does not make the latter non-real. I conclude by proposing a different way of distinguishing real from non-real kinds, which does not involve mind-independence and does not necessarily exclude psychological and social kinds.
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| first_indexed | 2024-03-13T09:06:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-eae7e822b74043b7adf639c006d6bc25 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2196-9663 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-13T09:06:21Z |
| publishDate | 2016-08-01 |
| publisher | University of Vienna |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Social Ontology |
| spelling | doaj.art-eae7e822b74043b7adf639c006d6bc252023-05-28T07:32:23ZengUniversity of ViennaJournal of Social Ontology2196-96632016-08-0122Mind-Dependent KindsMuhammad Ali Khalidi0York University Many philosophers take mind-independence to be criterial for realism about kinds. This is problematic when it comes to psychological and social kinds, which are unavoidably mind-dependent. But reflection on the case of artificial or synthetic kinds (e.g. synthetic chemicals, genetically modified organisms) shows that the criterion of mind-independence needs to be qualified in certain ways. However, I argue that none of the usual variants on the criterion of mind-dependence is capable of distinguishing real or natural kinds from non-real kinds. Although there is a way of modifying the criterion of mind-independence in such a way as to rule in artificial kinds but rule out psychological and social kinds, this does not make the latter non-real. I conclude by proposing a different way of distinguishing real from non-real kinds, which does not involve mind-independence and does not necessarily exclude psychological and social kinds. https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6834natural kindssocial kindspsychological kindshuman kindssocial ontology |
| spellingShingle | Muhammad Ali Khalidi Mind-Dependent Kinds Journal of Social Ontology natural kinds social kinds psychological kinds human kinds social ontology |
| title | Mind-Dependent Kinds |
| title_full | Mind-Dependent Kinds |
| title_fullStr | Mind-Dependent Kinds |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mind-Dependent Kinds |
| title_short | Mind-Dependent Kinds |
| title_sort | mind dependent kinds |
| topic | natural kinds social kinds psychological kinds human kinds social ontology |
| url | https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6834 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT muhammadalikhalidi minddependentkinds |