Plotinus’ views on soul, suicide, and incarnation

There is a question to be answered if one is to grasp the function of suicide in the Plotinian universe and its connection to the subject matters of soul, incarnation, murder and killing living beings. How far does the body exist as a degenerative trait? Could the purpose of embodying a soul purify...

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Main Author: Kalogiratou, Androniki
Format: Article
Language:ell
Published: Novosibirsk State University Press 2009-06-01
Series:SCHOLE
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.nsu.ru/classics/schole/3/3-2-kalog.pdf
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author Kalogiratou, Androniki
author_facet Kalogiratou, Androniki
author_sort Kalogiratou, Androniki
collection DOAJ
description There is a question to be answered if one is to grasp the function of suicide in the Plotinian universe and its connection to the subject matters of soul, incarnation, murder and killing living beings. How far does the body exist as a degenerative trait? Could the purpose of embodying a soul purify it and to what extent does the particular use of it by an individual soul point towards its ability to uncover hidden potentiality or simply makes it an instrument of self-destruction and self-alienation? Our view of Plotinus’ philosophy and its significance depends upon how we chose to solve this puzzle. Although Plotinus ultimately changed his attitude on suicide in Ennead 1.4.46 as compared to Ennead 1.9.16, the concept appears under three basic guises in his philosophy. One is the more traditional notion that we have today, whether given a choice to remain or to leave the body, the soul should remain? Beyond that, Plotinus enriches our view of suicide with two further notions: One is the idea of soul’s incarnation as an involuntary suicide, committed in the rush to attain matter. Finally there is the notion of suicide in the form of murder or killing a living being or plant. Killing another living being would be like attempting suicide: killing a part of the one unified, single soul to which we also partake. The difference between Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, of which Damascius was one, is that the latter won’t allow for the absolute detachment of the soul from the body, while the body is still alive. It thus becomes impossible for the soul of the prospective wise man, to venture completely into the positive nothingness of the Ineffable, because the soul is always bound to the body, and that results in its inability to escort its own self, so as to say, into that which is total nothingness and alien to the soul.
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spelling doaj.art-ebd7a7ff89284521bc2ac8e3a627ddb62022-12-25T10:44:17ZellNovosibirsk State University PressSCHOLE1995-43281995-43362009-06-0132387400Plotinus’ views on soul, suicide, and incarnationKalogiratou, Androniki0Athens UniversityThere is a question to be answered if one is to grasp the function of suicide in the Plotinian universe and its connection to the subject matters of soul, incarnation, murder and killing living beings. How far does the body exist as a degenerative trait? Could the purpose of embodying a soul purify it and to what extent does the particular use of it by an individual soul point towards its ability to uncover hidden potentiality or simply makes it an instrument of self-destruction and self-alienation? Our view of Plotinus’ philosophy and its significance depends upon how we chose to solve this puzzle. Although Plotinus ultimately changed his attitude on suicide in Ennead 1.4.46 as compared to Ennead 1.9.16, the concept appears under three basic guises in his philosophy. One is the more traditional notion that we have today, whether given a choice to remain or to leave the body, the soul should remain? Beyond that, Plotinus enriches our view of suicide with two further notions: One is the idea of soul’s incarnation as an involuntary suicide, committed in the rush to attain matter. Finally there is the notion of suicide in the form of murder or killing a living being or plant. Killing another living being would be like attempting suicide: killing a part of the one unified, single soul to which we also partake. The difference between Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, of which Damascius was one, is that the latter won’t allow for the absolute detachment of the soul from the body, while the body is still alive. It thus becomes impossible for the soul of the prospective wise man, to venture completely into the positive nothingness of the Ineffable, because the soul is always bound to the body, and that results in its inability to escort its own self, so as to say, into that which is total nothingness and alien to the soul.http://www.nsu.ru/classics/schole/3/3-2-kalog.pdfHuman behaviorfreedomfree choice and determinismsuicide
spellingShingle Kalogiratou, Androniki
Plotinus’ views on soul, suicide, and incarnation
SCHOLE
Human behavior
freedom
free choice and determinism
suicide
title Plotinus’ views on soul, suicide, and incarnation
title_full Plotinus’ views on soul, suicide, and incarnation
title_fullStr Plotinus’ views on soul, suicide, and incarnation
title_full_unstemmed Plotinus’ views on soul, suicide, and incarnation
title_short Plotinus’ views on soul, suicide, and incarnation
title_sort plotinus views on soul suicide and incarnation
topic Human behavior
freedom
free choice and determinism
suicide
url http://www.nsu.ru/classics/schole/3/3-2-kalog.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT kalogiratouandroniki plotinusviewsonsoulsuicideandincarnation