An Inconvenient Constraint

<p>On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especial...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Martijn van den Brink
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog GmbH 2023-06-01
Series:Verfassungsblog
Subjects:
Online Access:https://verfassungsblog.de/an-inconvenient-constraint/
Description
Summary:<p>On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especially as one may doubt if a Hungarian Council Presidency can do much practical damage to the EU. In addition, they also raise questions of legal feasibility. A logical prerequisite for preventing Hungary from holding the Presidency as long as it breaches the rule of law is that doing so is consistent with the EU’s own rule of law. I doubt it is.</p>
ISSN:2366-7044