An Inconvenient Constraint
<p>On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especial...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog GmbH
2023-06-01
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| Series: | Verfassungsblog |
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| Online Access: | https://verfassungsblog.de/an-inconvenient-constraint/ |
| _version_ | 1797809403683930112 |
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| author | Martijn van den Brink |
| author_facet | Martijn van den Brink |
| author_sort | Martijn van den Brink |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | <p>On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especially as one may doubt if a Hungarian Council Presidency can do much practical damage to the EU. In addition, they also raise questions of legal feasibility. A logical prerequisite for preventing Hungary from holding the Presidency as long as it breaches the rule of law is that doing so is consistent with the EU’s own rule of law. I doubt it is.</p>
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| first_indexed | 2024-03-13T06:52:11Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ec0cc81d0fce4b7f876e04373596a785 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2366-7044 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-13T06:52:11Z |
| publishDate | 2023-06-01 |
| publisher | Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog GmbH |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Verfassungsblog |
| spelling | doaj.art-ec0cc81d0fce4b7f876e04373596a7852023-06-07T14:52:47ZdeuMax Steinbeis Verfassungsblog GmbHVerfassungsblog2366-70442023-06-012366-7044An Inconvenient ConstraintMartijn van den Brink<p>On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especially as one may doubt if a Hungarian Council Presidency can do much practical damage to the EU. In addition, they also raise questions of legal feasibility. A logical prerequisite for preventing Hungary from holding the Presidency as long as it breaches the rule of law is that doing so is consistent with the EU’s own rule of law. I doubt it is.</p> https://verfassungsblog.de/an-inconvenient-constraint/Art. 7 TEU, Council, Democratic Backsliding, Hungary, Rule of Law |
| spellingShingle | Martijn van den Brink An Inconvenient Constraint Verfassungsblog Art. 7 TEU, Council, Democratic Backsliding, Hungary, Rule of Law |
| title | An Inconvenient Constraint |
| title_full | An Inconvenient Constraint |
| title_fullStr | An Inconvenient Constraint |
| title_full_unstemmed | An Inconvenient Constraint |
| title_short | An Inconvenient Constraint |
| title_sort | inconvenient constraint |
| topic | Art. 7 TEU, Council, Democratic Backsliding, Hungary, Rule of Law |
| url | https://verfassungsblog.de/an-inconvenient-constraint/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT martijnvandenbrink aninconvenientconstraint AT martijnvandenbrink inconvenientconstraint |