Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth?
ABSTRACT John MacFarlane’s truth relativism (2005, 2007, 2011, 2014) makes use of two notions of propositional truth: a monadic assessment sensitive one taken to be our ordinary truth notion, and a non-monadic one that is meant to account for the assessment sensitivity of the former notion. Some aut...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Estadual de Campinas
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| Series: | Manuscrito |
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017005002101&lng=en&tlng=en |
| _version_ | 1819229941207662592 |
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| author | Matías Gariazzo |
| author_facet | Matías Gariazzo |
| author_sort | Matías Gariazzo |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | ABSTRACT John MacFarlane’s truth relativism (2005, 2007, 2011, 2014) makes use of two notions of propositional truth: a monadic assessment sensitive one taken to be our ordinary truth notion, and a non-monadic one that is meant to account for the assessment sensitivity of the former notion. Some authors (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009, 2011; Montminy, 2009; Soames, 2011) contend that any theory introducing a technical non-monadic truth notion has to make sense of it (i.e. show that it is a truth notion) by defining or characterizing it in terms of ordinary monadic truth. First, I give some reasons why the relativist should not discard this approach to make sense of the notion of truth relative to a context of assessment. Second, I argue that an illuminating characterization of this notion must provide an answer to a dilemma Paul Boghossian (2011) poses to the relativist. Third, I single out the characterization that can answer this dilemma. Finally, I contend that the relativist still needs to show that this solution works for each case subject to a relativist treatment. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-23T11:21:10Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ec863cb30b1146dba516c31aa2efbf71 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2317-630X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-23T11:21:10Z |
| publisher | Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Manuscrito |
| spelling | doaj.art-ec863cb30b1146dba516c31aa2efbf712022-12-21T17:49:05ZengUniversidade Estadual de CampinasManuscrito2317-630X010.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n2.mgS0100-60452017005002101Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth?Matías GariazzoABSTRACT John MacFarlane’s truth relativism (2005, 2007, 2011, 2014) makes use of two notions of propositional truth: a monadic assessment sensitive one taken to be our ordinary truth notion, and a non-monadic one that is meant to account for the assessment sensitivity of the former notion. Some authors (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009, 2011; Montminy, 2009; Soames, 2011) contend that any theory introducing a technical non-monadic truth notion has to make sense of it (i.e. show that it is a truth notion) by defining or characterizing it in terms of ordinary monadic truth. First, I give some reasons why the relativist should not discard this approach to make sense of the notion of truth relative to a context of assessment. Second, I argue that an illuminating characterization of this notion must provide an answer to a dilemma Paul Boghossian (2011) poses to the relativist. Third, I single out the characterization that can answer this dilemma. Finally, I contend that the relativist still needs to show that this solution works for each case subject to a relativist treatment.http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017005002101&lng=en&tlng=entruth relativismassessment sensitivitymonadic truthnon-monadic truth |
| spellingShingle | Matías Gariazzo Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? Manuscrito truth relativism assessment sensitivity monadic truth non-monadic truth |
| title | Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
| title_full | Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
| title_fullStr | Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
| title_short | Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
| title_sort | can we make sense of macfarlane s relative truth |
| topic | truth relativism assessment sensitivity monadic truth non-monadic truth |
| url | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017005002101&lng=en&tlng=en |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT matiasgariazzo canwemakesenseofmacfarlanesrelativetruth |