Family Ownership Concentration and Debt in Dividends Policies
<p>This study aims to examine whether or not family control benefiting the internal and external governance mechanism to mitigate to agency problems affecting dividends in a capital market environment to improve investor protection such as Indonesia. The quantitative analysis model was used to...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Prasetiya Mulya Publishing
2022-11-01
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| Series: | International Research Journal of Business Studies |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://irjbs.com/index.php/jurnalirjbs/article/view/2476 |
| _version_ | 1797679264896647168 |
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| author | Herlina Yoka Roida Resty Fauzyah Yahya Nekhasius Agus Sunarjanto |
| author_facet | Herlina Yoka Roida Resty Fauzyah Yahya Nekhasius Agus Sunarjanto |
| author_sort | Herlina Yoka Roida |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | <p>This study aims to examine whether or not family control benefiting the internal and external governance mechanism to mitigate to agency problems affecting dividends in a capital market environment to improve investor protection such as Indonesia. The quantitative analysis model was used to test the hypotheses based on the panel data analysis of 58 family firms listed from 2012 to 2019, and the random effect technique (pooled EGLS). The findings indicate that internal governance mechanism (family ownership and family board representation) are irrelevant to the dividend policy. However, external governance mechanism (debt) negatively affects dividends. This means that debt plays a significant role in influencing dividend policies. In addition, it provides the issue from institutional setting, when legal protection for minority shareholders is improving, the governance role of families become less effective to monitor the firms. </p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T23:12:01Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ed0925b4c0664303a63d45ce0d87834b |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2089-6271 2338-4565 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T23:12:01Z |
| publishDate | 2022-11-01 |
| publisher | Prasetiya Mulya Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | International Research Journal of Business Studies |
| spelling | doaj.art-ed0925b4c0664303a63d45ce0d87834b2023-09-21T07:58:50ZengPrasetiya Mulya PublishingInternational Research Journal of Business Studies2089-62712338-45652022-11-0115220521710.21632/irjbs.15.2.205-217292Family Ownership Concentration and Debt in Dividends PoliciesHerlina Yoka Roida0Resty Fauzyah Yahya1Nekhasius Agus Sunarjanto2Faculty of Business Widya Mandala Catholic University Surabaya Indonesia, Jl. Kalisari Selatan No.1 Kalisari, Pakuwon City, Kec. Mulyorejo, Kota Surabaya, Jawa Timur 60112, IndonesiaFaculty of Business Widya Mandala Catholic University Surabaya Indonesia, Jl. Kalisari Selatan No.1 Kalisari, Pakuwon City, Kec. Mulyorejo, Kota Surabaya, Jawa Timur 60112, IndonesiaFaculty of Business Widya Mandala Catholic University Surabaya Indonesia, Jl. Kalisari Selatan No.1 Kalisari, Pakuwon City, Kec. Mulyorejo, Kota Surabaya, Jawa Timur 60112, Indonesia<p>This study aims to examine whether or not family control benefiting the internal and external governance mechanism to mitigate to agency problems affecting dividends in a capital market environment to improve investor protection such as Indonesia. The quantitative analysis model was used to test the hypotheses based on the panel data analysis of 58 family firms listed from 2012 to 2019, and the random effect technique (pooled EGLS). The findings indicate that internal governance mechanism (family ownership and family board representation) are irrelevant to the dividend policy. However, external governance mechanism (debt) negatively affects dividends. This means that debt plays a significant role in influencing dividend policies. In addition, it provides the issue from institutional setting, when legal protection for minority shareholders is improving, the governance role of families become less effective to monitor the firms. </p>https://irjbs.com/index.php/jurnalirjbs/article/view/2476dividendsfamily firmsfamily ownershipfamily board representationdebtagency problem |
| spellingShingle | Herlina Yoka Roida Resty Fauzyah Yahya Nekhasius Agus Sunarjanto Family Ownership Concentration and Debt in Dividends Policies International Research Journal of Business Studies dividends family firms family ownership family board representation debt agency problem |
| title | Family Ownership Concentration and Debt in Dividends Policies |
| title_full | Family Ownership Concentration and Debt in Dividends Policies |
| title_fullStr | Family Ownership Concentration and Debt in Dividends Policies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Family Ownership Concentration and Debt in Dividends Policies |
| title_short | Family Ownership Concentration and Debt in Dividends Policies |
| title_sort | family ownership concentration and debt in dividends policies |
| topic | dividends family firms family ownership family board representation debt agency problem |
| url | https://irjbs.com/index.php/jurnalirjbs/article/view/2476 |
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