Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model
We model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist’s benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime can be lucrative for a terrorist but may deter benefactors, thus causing a s...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Bielefeld
2017-12-01
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| Series: | International Journal of Conflict and Violence |
| Online Access: | https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3091 |
| _version_ | 1818315763178536960 |
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| author | Kjell Hausken |
| author_facet | Kjell Hausken |
| author_sort | Kjell Hausken |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist’s benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime can be lucrative for a terrorist but may deter benefactors, thus causing a strategic dilemma. The model accounts for resources, costs of effort, valuations of terrorism by the three players, and crime production characteristics. We determine how a variety of model parameters, the government, and the benefactor influence a terrorist’s terrorism and crime efforts, and relative ideological orientation along a continuum from ideological to criminal. We determine which factors impact government protection, for example that it is inverse U shaped in terrorism effort. We determine the implications of letting the benefactor choose optimal funding and/or punishment for crime, for example eliminating punishment if both are chosen optimally. The model parameters are estimated for sixty-five terrorist groups using the global terrorism database and the fragile states index. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-13T09:10:42Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ee10fd24947f47eb880d296a34d2e352 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1864-1385 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-13T09:10:42Z |
| publishDate | 2017-12-01 |
| publisher | University of Bielefeld |
| record_format | Article |
| series | International Journal of Conflict and Violence |
| spelling | doaj.art-ee10fd24947f47eb880d296a34d2e3522022-12-21T23:52:56ZengUniversity of BielefeldInternational Journal of Conflict and Violence1864-13852017-12-011110.4119/ijcv-3091Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic ModelKjell HauskenWe model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist’s benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime can be lucrative for a terrorist but may deter benefactors, thus causing a strategic dilemma. The model accounts for resources, costs of effort, valuations of terrorism by the three players, and crime production characteristics. We determine how a variety of model parameters, the government, and the benefactor influence a terrorist’s terrorism and crime efforts, and relative ideological orientation along a continuum from ideological to criminal. We determine which factors impact government protection, for example that it is inverse U shaped in terrorism effort. We determine the implications of letting the benefactor choose optimal funding and/or punishment for crime, for example eliminating punishment if both are chosen optimally. The model parameters are estimated for sixty-five terrorist groups using the global terrorism database and the fragile states index.https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3091 |
| spellingShingle | Kjell Hausken Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model International Journal of Conflict and Violence |
| title | Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model |
| title_full | Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model |
| title_fullStr | Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model |
| title_full_unstemmed | Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model |
| title_short | Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model |
| title_sort | government protection against terrorists funded by benefactors and crime an economic model |
| url | https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3091 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kjellhausken governmentprotectionagainstterroristsfundedbybenefactorsandcrimeaneconomicmodel |