Cooperation and defection at the crossroads.

We study a simple traffic model with a non-signalized road intersection. In this model the car arriving from the right has precedence. The vehicle dynamics far from the crossing are governed by the rules introduced by Nagel and Paczuski, which define how drivers behave when braking or accelerating....

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Main Authors: Guillermo Abramson, Viktoriya Semeshenko, José Roberto Iglesias
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2013-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3627652?pdf=render
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author Guillermo Abramson
Viktoriya Semeshenko
José Roberto Iglesias
author_facet Guillermo Abramson
Viktoriya Semeshenko
José Roberto Iglesias
author_sort Guillermo Abramson
collection DOAJ
description We study a simple traffic model with a non-signalized road intersection. In this model the car arriving from the right has precedence. The vehicle dynamics far from the crossing are governed by the rules introduced by Nagel and Paczuski, which define how drivers behave when braking or accelerating. We measure the average velocity of the ensemble of cars and its flow as a function of the density of cars on the roadway. An additional set of rules is defined to describe the dynamics at the intersection assuming a fraction of drivers that do not obey the rule of precedence. This problem is treated within a game-theory framework, where the drivers that obey the rule are cooperators and those who ignore it are defectors. We study the consequences of these behaviors as a function of the fraction of cooperators and defectors. The results show that cooperation is the best strategy because it maximizes the flow of vehicles and minimizes the number of accidents. A rather paradoxical effect is observed: for any percentage of defectors the number of accidents is larger when the density of cars is low because of the higher average velocity.
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spelling doaj.art-eec73950fe69442baaa7bb8674a191932022-12-21T23:54:30ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032013-01-0184e6187610.1371/journal.pone.0061876Cooperation and defection at the crossroads.Guillermo AbramsonViktoriya SemeshenkoJosé Roberto IglesiasWe study a simple traffic model with a non-signalized road intersection. In this model the car arriving from the right has precedence. The vehicle dynamics far from the crossing are governed by the rules introduced by Nagel and Paczuski, which define how drivers behave when braking or accelerating. We measure the average velocity of the ensemble of cars and its flow as a function of the density of cars on the roadway. An additional set of rules is defined to describe the dynamics at the intersection assuming a fraction of drivers that do not obey the rule of precedence. This problem is treated within a game-theory framework, where the drivers that obey the rule are cooperators and those who ignore it are defectors. We study the consequences of these behaviors as a function of the fraction of cooperators and defectors. The results show that cooperation is the best strategy because it maximizes the flow of vehicles and minimizes the number of accidents. A rather paradoxical effect is observed: for any percentage of defectors the number of accidents is larger when the density of cars is low because of the higher average velocity.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3627652?pdf=render
spellingShingle Guillermo Abramson
Viktoriya Semeshenko
José Roberto Iglesias
Cooperation and defection at the crossroads.
PLoS ONE
title Cooperation and defection at the crossroads.
title_full Cooperation and defection at the crossroads.
title_fullStr Cooperation and defection at the crossroads.
title_full_unstemmed Cooperation and defection at the crossroads.
title_short Cooperation and defection at the crossroads.
title_sort cooperation and defection at the crossroads
url http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3627652?pdf=render
work_keys_str_mv AT guillermoabramson cooperationanddefectionatthecrossroads
AT viktoriyasemeshenko cooperationanddefectionatthecrossroads
AT joserobertoiglesias cooperationanddefectionatthecrossroads