Perils from Within and Without
<p>The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is described as one of the few success stories of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). In contrast to the state-level legislature, the Court’s decision-making process in principle cannot be vetoed. Voting rules do not condition the...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
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Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog GmbH
2023-07-01
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Series: | Verfassungsblog |
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Online Access: | https://verfassungsblog.de/perils-from-within-and-without/ |
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author | Harun Išerić Maja Sahadžić |
author_facet | Harun Išerić Maja Sahadžić |
author_sort | Harun Išerić |
collection | DOAJ |
description | <p>The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is described as one of the few success stories of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). In contrast to the state-level legislature, the Court’s decision-making process in principle cannot be vetoed. Voting rules do not condition the presence of all three ethnic groups. This has made it difficult for Republika Srpska’s (RS) political leadership to block, boycott or undermine the work of the Court compared to other state-level institutions. However, recent months saw the RS identifying and seizing a rare moment of vulnerability with potentially severe consequences. If RS does not elect new judges in the meantime, not even a Court’s small chamber will be able to operate.</p>
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first_indexed | 2024-03-12T21:36:01Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-eee58330ef6e41439e23b5af04c99d5c |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2366-7044 |
language | deu |
last_indexed | 2024-03-12T21:36:01Z |
publishDate | 2023-07-01 |
publisher | Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog GmbH |
record_format | Article |
series | Verfassungsblog |
spelling | doaj.art-eee58330ef6e41439e23b5af04c99d5c2023-07-27T07:23:45ZdeuMax Steinbeis Verfassungsblog GmbHVerfassungsblog2366-70442023-07-012366-7044Perils from Within and WithoutHarun IšerićMaja Sahadžić<p>The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is described as one of the few success stories of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). In contrast to the state-level legislature, the Court’s decision-making process in principle cannot be vetoed. Voting rules do not condition the presence of all three ethnic groups. This has made it difficult for Republika Srpska’s (RS) political leadership to block, boycott or undermine the work of the Court compared to other state-level institutions. However, recent months saw the RS identifying and seizing a rare moment of vulnerability with potentially severe consequences. If RS does not elect new judges in the meantime, not even a Court’s small chamber will be able to operate.</p> https://verfassungsblog.de/perils-from-within-and-without/Bosnia and Herzegovina, Constitutional Court, Ethnic Power-sharing, High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
spellingShingle | Harun Išerić Maja Sahadžić Perils from Within and Without Verfassungsblog Bosnia and Herzegovina, Constitutional Court, Ethnic Power-sharing, High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
title | Perils from Within and Without |
title_full | Perils from Within and Without |
title_fullStr | Perils from Within and Without |
title_full_unstemmed | Perils from Within and Without |
title_short | Perils from Within and Without |
title_sort | perils from within and without |
topic | Bosnia and Herzegovina, Constitutional Court, Ethnic Power-sharing, High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
url | https://verfassungsblog.de/perils-from-within-and-without/ |
work_keys_str_mv | AT haruniseric perilsfromwithinandwithout AT majasahadzic perilsfromwithinandwithout |