When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics
The enhancement debate in neuroscience and biomedical ethics tends to focus on the augmentation of certain capacities or functions: memory, learning, attention, and the like. Typically, the point of contention is whether these augmentative enhancements are permissible for individuals with no particu...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2014-02-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnsys.2014.00012/full |
| _version_ | 1818031732441481216 |
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| author | Brian D. Earp Anders eSandberg Guy eKahane Julian eSavulescu |
| author_facet | Brian D. Earp Anders eSandberg Guy eKahane Julian eSavulescu |
| author_sort | Brian D. Earp |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The enhancement debate in neuroscience and biomedical ethics tends to focus on the augmentation of certain capacities or functions: memory, learning, attention, and the like. Typically, the point of contention is whether these augmentative enhancements are permissible for individuals with no particular ‘medical’ disadvantage along any of the dimensions of interest. Less frequently addressed in the literature, however, is the fact that sometimes the diminishment of a capacity or function, under the right set of circumstances, could plausibly contribute to an individual’s overall well-being: more is not always better, and sometimes less is more. Such cases may be especially likely, we suggest, when trade-offs in our modern environment have shifted since the environment of evolutionary adaptation. In this article, we introduce the notion of diminishment as enhancement and go on to defend a welfarist conception of enhancement. We show how this conception resolves a number of definitional ambiguities in the enhancement literature, and we suggest that it can provide a useful framework for thinking about the use of emerging neurotechnologies to promote human flourishing. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-10T05:56:09Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-eefc76ee7bad44d49fb48cb64c034efd |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1662-5137 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-10T05:56:09Z |
| publishDate | 2014-02-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience |
| spelling | doaj.art-eefc76ee7bad44d49fb48cb64c034efd2022-12-22T01:59:56ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience1662-51372014-02-01810.3389/fnsys.2014.0001267888When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethicsBrian D. Earp0Anders eSandberg1Guy eKahane2Julian eSavulescu3University of OxfordUniversity of OxfordUniversity of OxfordUniversity of OxfordThe enhancement debate in neuroscience and biomedical ethics tends to focus on the augmentation of certain capacities or functions: memory, learning, attention, and the like. Typically, the point of contention is whether these augmentative enhancements are permissible for individuals with no particular ‘medical’ disadvantage along any of the dimensions of interest. Less frequently addressed in the literature, however, is the fact that sometimes the diminishment of a capacity or function, under the right set of circumstances, could plausibly contribute to an individual’s overall well-being: more is not always better, and sometimes less is more. Such cases may be especially likely, we suggest, when trade-offs in our modern environment have shifted since the environment of evolutionary adaptation. In this article, we introduce the notion of diminishment as enhancement and go on to defend a welfarist conception of enhancement. We show how this conception resolves a number of definitional ambiguities in the enhancement literature, and we suggest that it can provide a useful framework for thinking about the use of emerging neurotechnologies to promote human flourishing.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnsys.2014.00012/fullBioethicsEmpathyEthicsMedicineNeuropsychiatryNeuropsychology |
| spellingShingle | Brian D. Earp Anders eSandberg Guy eKahane Julian eSavulescu When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience Bioethics Empathy Ethics Medicine Neuropsychiatry Neuropsychology |
| title | When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics |
| title_full | When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics |
| title_fullStr | When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics |
| title_full_unstemmed | When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics |
| title_short | When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics |
| title_sort | when is diminishment a form of enhancement rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics |
| topic | Bioethics Empathy Ethics Medicine Neuropsychiatry Neuropsychology |
| url | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnsys.2014.00012/full |
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