"Not a Something"
Wittgenstein’s remark in section 304 of the Investigations that a sensation “is not a something, but not a nothing either” has often been connected with his critique of the “picture of an inner process”, and there is a temptation to read “something” as meaning “something private”. I argue that his r...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Nordic Wittgenstein Society
2017-06-01
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| Series: | Nordic Wittgenstein Review |
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| Online Access: | http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3446 |
| _version_ | 1819210612637433856 |
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| author | Roger Teichmann |
| author_facet | Roger Teichmann |
| author_sort | Roger Teichmann |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Wittgenstein’s remark in section 304 of the Investigations that a sensation “is not a something, but not a nothing either” has often been connected with his critique of the “picture of an inner process”, and there is a temptation to read “something” as meaning “something private”. I argue that his remark should be taken more at face value, and that we can understand its purport via a consideration of the notion of consisting in. I explore this multi-faceted notion and its connection with (an extended version of) the Context Principle, beginning with the case of certain “propositional attitudes” and moving on to sensations. Wittgenstein was right to think it a philosophical prejudice to say that X’s being in pain, say, must consist in, be constituted by, something. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-23T06:13:57Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ef17ef7c30994363afd032ac93ab97c5 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2194-6825 2242-248X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-23T06:13:57Z |
| publishDate | 2017-06-01 |
| publisher | Nordic Wittgenstein Society |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Nordic Wittgenstein Review |
| spelling | doaj.art-ef17ef7c30994363afd032ac93ab97c52022-12-21T17:57:22ZengNordic Wittgenstein SocietyNordic Wittgenstein Review2194-68252242-248X2017-06-016193010.15845/nwr.v6i1.34463446"Not a Something"Roger Teichmann0St Hilda's College, OxfordWittgenstein’s remark in section 304 of the Investigations that a sensation “is not a something, but not a nothing either” has often been connected with his critique of the “picture of an inner process”, and there is a temptation to read “something” as meaning “something private”. I argue that his remark should be taken more at face value, and that we can understand its purport via a consideration of the notion of consisting in. I explore this multi-faceted notion and its connection with (an extended version of) the Context Principle, beginning with the case of certain “propositional attitudes” and moving on to sensations. Wittgenstein was right to think it a philosophical prejudice to say that X’s being in pain, say, must consist in, be constituted by, something.http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3446sensationsWittgenstein LudwigPhilosophical Investigations |
| spellingShingle | Roger Teichmann "Not a Something" Nordic Wittgenstein Review sensations Wittgenstein Ludwig Philosophical Investigations |
| title | "Not a Something" |
| title_full | "Not a Something" |
| title_fullStr | "Not a Something" |
| title_full_unstemmed | "Not a Something" |
| title_short | "Not a Something" |
| title_sort | not a something |
| topic | sensations Wittgenstein Ludwig Philosophical Investigations |
| url | http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3446 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT rogerteichmann notasomething |